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INTRODUCTION
At the outset, it is useful to observe some basic truisms about
amateur and professional sports in this country. First, and proba-
bly foremost, sports is a big money industry.1 Owners, players,
* Associate, Gross, Hanlon, Truss & Messer, P.C., Freehold, New Jersey. The Author
has served as an ice hockey official and as an ice hocky coach, and specializes in entertain-
ment and sports law. B.S. Kean College (1988); J.D., Seton Hall School of Law (1993). The
Author would like to thank Justin Luna for his contribution in the preparation of this
Comment.
1. See, e.g., Bradley C. Nielsen, Controlling Sports Violence: Too Late for the Car-
rots-Bring on the Big Stick, 74 IOWA L. REV. 681, 681 n.1 (1989). Consider also that the
total gross revenues for the major professional leagues in this country in 1988 reached $2.7
billion. Robert J. Samuelson, Sporting Life: Oh, The Money We Spend-And Bet-On
Sports, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1989, at A23. Of 1988's total $2.7 billion figure, Major League
Baseball (MLB) accounted for the most revenues, at approximately $1 billion. Id. More
currently, for the 1991 season, MLB's average salary was $851,492. How Does A 42.5-Per-
cent Increase In Salary Sound? Players' Average Raises, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 5, 1991, at
C4.
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agents, retailers, and cities prosper each year from the tremendous
revenues derived from both amateur and professional sports. Addi-
tionally, a host of promotional and media groups are required to
coordinate and cover these events for millions of viewers and lis-
teners each year so that today's sports fan can access virtually any
sport from nearly anywhere in the country (and sometimes the
world) at the push of a button.
Another group of individuals play perhaps the most important
supporting role (and certainly most immediate to the participants
themselves) within this massive industry: the sports officials.2
However, unlike the other groups, sports officials do not usually
benefit from the tremendous revenues, and rarely (if ever) succeed
in gaining the public spotlight in a favorable way.3 Most fans know
nothing about the officials on a personal level, and are not even
aware of the particular function they play in officiating a game or
event." Unfortunately, the official receives no attention until he or
2. As used herein, the term "sports official" denotes a person implementing certain
rules of a game for the orderly playing of a particular sporting event. In contrast, some
commentators define "sports officials" as "those individuals who officiate or are charged
with the administration of a game or contest." Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis & Frank S.
Forbes, A Proposal for a Uniform Statute Regulating the Liability of Sports Officials for
Errors Committed in Sports Contests, 39 DEPAUL L.REv. 673, 673 n.1 (1990) [hereinafter
Lewis & Forbes]. Depending upon the sporting event, there may be different types of, and
responsibilities for, "sports officials." See Victoria J. Davis, Sports Liability: Blowing the
Whistle on the Referees 12 PAC. L.J. 937, 937 n.1 (1981) (hereinafter Davis). For example,
in amateur ice hockey, the sports officials consist of a referee, a linesman, a goal judge, an
official scorer, and a timekeeper. See 1993-95 Official Playing Rules of USA Amateur
Hockey, Rules 502-507 (1993) [hereinafter USA Hockey Rules]. The referee is responsible
for the calling of penalties and has "general supervision of the game, and shall have full
control of all game officials and players during the game, including stoppages .... " Id.
Rule 502(a). Conversely, the Linesman's duties are to "determine any infractions of the
rules concerning off-side play at the blue lines, or center line, or any violation of the 'Icing
the Puck' rule." Id. at Rule 503(a). Finally, although some commentators have equated
sports officials with "participants," some courts have not. See, e.g., Charles E. Friend et al.
eds., 4 ACTIONS AND REMEDIES § 17:08 (1986 rev. ed.) (stating that "participants" encompass
"all persons who participate in the activity, including ... umpires or referees, and addi-
tional personnel, such as . . . scorekeepers .... " (footnotes omitted)). Compare Hockey
Club of Saginaw v. Ins. Co. N. Am., 468 F. Supp. 101, 103 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (holding in-
jured sports official could recover under hockey club's comprehensive general liability policy
despite exclusion for personal injury incurred while "participating" in sports contest be-
cause linesman was not deemed a "sports participant").
3. See, e.g., Marty Noble, Rose's Punishment Manager Suspended 30 Days for Shov-
ing Ump, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 3, 1988, at 138 (describing incident where Cincinnati Reds
manager Pete Rose pushed an umpire during a game against the New York Mets). See also,
Tim Dermody, Games Have Been Canceled Because of the No-shows-Most Blame the
Walk-on Coaches with Interest in Only One Sport. What Happened to the Umpires?, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1989, at pt. 3, p. 18, col. 1 (describing difficult and abusive conditions,
including nominal pay, which purportedly led to shortage of baseball umpires).
4. Often, officials must balance competing "functions" in overseeing the action. This
(Vol. 11:375
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she has "erred" 5 or is sued.
Recent stories detail the proliferation of lawsuits directed at
sports officials.6 To illustrate the number and variety of stories re-
lated to litigation against sports officials, consider the following
events which were recently highlighted in the February 1994 issue
of Referee magazine:
Legal Log. From courtrooms of various venues came these legal
cases impacting officials.. . . U.S. District judge dismisses defa-
mation lawsuit filed by ex-Atlantic Coast Conference women's
basketball ref Pete Reed against the ACC; Dee Todd, supervisor
of ACC women's basketball refs, and Ray Johnstone, then-ACC
coordinator of women's basketball officials.. . . Former NFL of-
ficial Ben Dreith receives $165,000 plus $100,000 in legal fees for
settling age-bias complaint vs. NFL. . . . Gene Calhoun, former
Big Ten Conference football referee and ex-Big Ten supervisor
of football officials, given two years probation after pleading no
contest to cocaine-possession charge .... Dallas rec basketball
league commissioner sentenced to one year probation and or-
dered to pay medical costs to Brian Brock, a six-year official
who the commish [sic] punched in a post-game incident. . . . A
17-year old boy was killed and umpire Robert Lloyd's house was
set on fire after a melee following a Castro Valley, Calif., youth
baseball game. . .. N.L. ump Joe West files $10 million lawsuit
claiming that a longtime associate stole West's idea for a new
model chest protector . . . . Ron Blaufarb, a football official
from Suffolk, N.Y., receives an $8,800 out-of-court settlement
from a November 1988 assault at a local high school.
7
This Comment addresses those situations where the sports of-
ficial receives "attention" from being sued.8 Surprisingly, the lia-
usually goes unnoticed by the fans. See, e.g., Thorn Greer, Men in the Middle - Referees
Must Prevent Injury yet Satisfy Fans, PHIL. INQUIRER, May 19, 1983, at C06 (describing
boxing referees' dilemma in trying to maintain the competitiveness of a bout while protect-
ing the safety of the boxers).
5. As used herein, an "error" refers to "[a] mistaken judgment . BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 542 (6th ed. 1990). Other commentators writing on this topic have defined a
sports official's "error" as either a "misidentification of fact[]," a "misinterpretation of [a]
rule[]," or the official assessment of a penalty "other than the prescribed penalty.
Lewis & Forbes, supra note 2, at 673, n.2.
6. See, e.g., Robert Tomsho, More Referees Play Defense-In the Courts, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 11, 1989, at B1; David Brooks, Umpires, Referees Are New Negligence Suit
Targets, 119 N.J.L.J. 757 (Apr. 30, 1987).
7. Jerry Tapp, 1993 The Year in Review, 19 Referee 36, 41 (Feb. 1994). See also Erik
Brady, For Officials, Judgment Call Has New Role, USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1990, at 01C (re-
counting law suits against sports officials).
8. This Comment includes anecdotes from the sport of ice hockey whenever possible.
Although subjecting this Comment to great debate, it is submitted that ice hockey is one of
19941
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bility of a sports official, or as it is sometimes called, "sports offi-
cial malpractice," has received a fair amount of attention from
commentators10 and cases" in this country and abroad.
1 2
As one response to the increasing number of lawsuits involving
sports officials, some state legislatures have enacted statutes to
protect officials; they address issues such as the assault and battery
of officials,"3 and other sidelights." More pertinent to this Com-
the more difficult, if not the most difficult, sports to officiate. Yet, interestingly, most com-
mentators (and even statutes, as will be seen), do not take into account the rapidly growing
sport of ice hockey.
9. The term "sports official malpractice" embraces, as one author suggests, "bad
judgment in calls, permitting games to be played under bad field conditions, allowing events
to proceed despite threatening weather, and not inspecting the quality of equipment used
by players." WALTER T. CHAMPION, FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW § 4:1, at 76 (1990) [here-
inafter Champion].
10. See, e.g., GEORGE W. SCHUBERT ET AL., SPORTS LAW 232-33 (1986); Herb Appen-
zeller ed., SPORTS AND LAW: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 188-206 (1985) [hereinafter SPORTS AND
LAW]; JAMES A. BALEY & DAVID L. MATTHEWS, LAW AND LIABILITY IN ATHLETICS, PHYSICAL
EDUCATION, AND RECREATION 6 (1984); ALAN S. GOLDBERGER, SPORTS OFFICIATING: A LEGAL
GUIDE (1984) [hereinafter Goldberger]; Scott Parvin, Judgment Calls-Sports Officials in
Court, 9 ENT. AND SPORTS LAW 9 (Fall 1991); Lewis & Forbes, supra note 2; Melvin S. Narol,
Courts May Soon Be Asked to be Monday-Morning Quarterbacks, 3 ENT. AND SPORTS LAW
11 (Summer 1984); Davis, supra note 2; A.M. Swarthout, Annotation, Liability for Injury to
or Death of Umpire, Referee, or A Judge of Game or Contest, 10 A.L.R.3d 446 (1966). See
also Melvin S. Narol, Sports Torts: A Standard of Care Issue, 134 N.J. LAW. 41 (May/June
1990) [hereinafter Narol, Sports Torts]; Melvin S. Narol, Protecting the Rights of Sports
Officials, 23 TRIAL 64 (Jan. 1987) [hereinafter Narol, Protecting Rights]; Brooks, supra note
6; Melvin S. Narol, Refereeing Athletic Officials' Calls is Ruled Out-of-Bounds for Courts, 9
NAT'L. L.J. 24 (Sept. 29, 1986); Melvin S. Narol, The Official's Potential Liability for Inju-
ries in Sporting Events, 4 NAT'L. L.J. 20 (Sept. 6, 1982); Melvin S. Narol & Stuart Dedo-
poulos, The Official's Potential Liability for Injuries in Sporting Events, 4 NAT'L. L.J. 20
(Sept. 6, 1982); Melvin S. Narol & Stuart Dedopoulos, The Official's Right to Sue for Game-
related Injuries, 4 NAT'L. L.J. 26 (June 7, 1982); Melvin S. Narol & Stuart Dedopoulos,
Defamation: A Guide to Referees' Rights, 16 TRIAL 42 (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter Narol, Defa-
mation]; Melvin S. Narol & Stuart Dedopoulos, Potential Liability: A Guide to Referees'
Rights, 16 TRIAL 18 (March 1980) [hereinafter Narol, Potential Liability]; Melvin S. Narol
& Stuart Dedopoulos, Kill the Umpire: A Guide to Referees' Rights, 15 TRIAL 32 (March
1979) [hereinafter Narol, Kill the Umpire].
11. See infra notes 43-77 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., G.M. Kelly, Prospective Liabilities of Sport Supervisors, 63 AUSTRL. L.J.
669 (1989); 31 CAN. ENC. DIG. ONT. § 59 (3rd ed. 1990) (citing cases).
13. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.8 (West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 614 (Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-211 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 650.1
(West Supp. 1994); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2712 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-15a
(Supp. 1993). The constitutionality of Oklahoma's statute was upheld in Carroll v. State,
620 P.2d 416 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
In New Jersey, recent legislation has been introduced which would stiffen penalties for
fans who assault sports officials and coaches. See Stacie Servetah, No Roughing the Ref,
ASBURY PARK PRESS, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al. These tougher penalties would include up to nine
months in jail for fans threatening sports officials, with the penalty increasing to four years
if the official is injured. Id. at A6.
14. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-45-20.7 (Supp. 1993) (granting sports offi-
[Vol. 11:375
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ment, some states have also attempted to curb the ever increasing
threat of tort liability. 5
This Comment agrees with the position taken by those states
that grant sports officials a qualified tort immunity in civil law-
suits. Qualified immunity posits that unless the sports official par-
takes in actions or conduct which constitute either "gross negli-
gence" or "recklessness," the sports official should not be held
liable for his or her acts. Thus, sports officials are protected from
claims of "ordinary negligence."
Part I of this Comment surveys the current state of the law
regarding "sports official malpractice," and includes a discussion of
that body of law's antithesis-the sports official as plaintiff. It is
important to understand how sports officials fare as plaintiffs in
order to comprehend why an alleged breach of a sports official's
standard of care should not be actionable where the allegations
claim acts of "ordinary negligence."
Part II critiques the current standard, which generally im-
putes liability based on a showing of "ordinary negligence;" it con-
cludes that absent situations where the sports official has commit-
ted a crime, an intentional tort, or has been found to have acted in
a manner which constitutes recklessness or gross negligence,, the
official should not be liable for damages or otherwise legally re-
sponsible for "negligent" acts. 7
cials a tax exemption for "gross receipts of persons officiating amateur sporting events").
15. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
16. Arguably, the conceptual difference between "ordinary" negligence and "gross"
negligence is just that-a concept, and nothing more. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this
Comment, "gross" negligence is a breach of a standard of conduct which constitutes a deri-
vation greater than "ordinary" negligence but which is less than tortious recklessness.
As it originally appeared, this [gross negligence] was very great negligence, or the
want of even slight or scant care. It has been described as a failure to exercise
even that care which a careless person would use. Several courts, however, dis-
satisfied with a term so nebulous, and struggling to assign some more or less
definite point of reference to it, have construed gross negligence as requiring
willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or such utter lack of all care as will be
evidence thereof-sometimes on the ground that this must necessarily have been
the intent of the legislature. But it is still true that most courts consider that
"gross negligence" falls short of a reckless disregard of the consequences, and
differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind. There is, in
short, no generally accepted meaning; but the probability is, when the phrase is
used, that it signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less
perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.
W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 211-12 (5th ed. 1984) (foot-
notes omitted) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON].
17. Because of the obviousness of a sports official's responsibility for his or her crimi-
nal acts and his or her liability for the commission of an intentional tort, this Comment only
addresses the extent that liability may be imposed upon a sports official for his or her neg!i-
1994]
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PART I: SPORTS OFFICIALS AND THE LAW
A. The Sports Official and Basic Tort Concepts
Any discussion of liability in negligence18 for personal inju-
ries"e must begin with a brief discussion of the general principles of
gent acts.
18. Tortious theories have not been the only bases for sports officials' liability. Some
commentators have argued that officials should be liable under a "contractual duty of care"
analysis. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 2, at 946-48 ("Obviously, a contract for a referee's
services is intended to benefit sports participants, and athletes rely on having those services
carried out in a non-negligent manner."). It is submitted that this reasoning is flawed be-
cause the reality is that most sports officials do not have contracts when they undertake to
officiate a game. Moreover, even if such a document does exist, sports officials' contracts do
not usually talk in terms of "quality of performance," but rather address personal concerns
of the official such as "the fee, date, time of cancellation, rain-out arrangements, number of
officials on the game and working conditions." GOLDBERGER, supra note 10, at 136. See also
Lewis & Forbes, supra note 2, at 699 ("Typically, these contracts are drafted in a sketchy
manner. The lack of details makes it difficult to analyze the parties' intent respecting sports
officials' liability." (footnote omitted)). Thus, any analysis seeking to impose liability on
sports officials based on contract principles should be viewed with skepticism.
19. Lawsuits involving personal injuries are not the only actions that have been
brought against sports officials. For example, sports officials have been tortiously sued for
economic loss caused by their erroneous officiating; however, no court to date has been re-
ceptive to these theories. See, e.g., Bain v. Gillispie, 357 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983)
(affirming dismissal, absent showing of corruption or bad faith, of store owner's claim
against basketball official where store owner asserted official's erroneous call destroyed store
owner's market for selling sports memorabilia because the team the memorabilia portrayed
had been eliminated from conference championship by the official's erroneous call); Georgia
High Sch. Ass'n v. Waddel, 285 S.E.2d 7, 9 (Ga. 1981) (per curiam) (holding high school
football referee's call made during high school football game, although erroneous, did "not
present [a] judicial controvers[y]" and hence, it was not judicially reviewable). See also
JOHN C. WEISTART & CYM H. LOWELL, THE LAW OP SPORTS § 2.15, at 154 (1979) (stating
"the general rule will be that, in the absence of bad faith or corruption, the decisions of
judges, umpires or referees in athletic contests will be final, and will not be disturbed-that
is, they will be presumptively correct." (footnote omitted)); Suit Flagged Refs Are Not Lia-
ble for Malpractice, Court Rules, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 7, 1984, at D07 (reporting court's
ruling in Bain).
Some commentators posit that this position, however, may change with the advent of
instant replay or sophisticated video technology. See, e.g., SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10,
at 202; Lewis & Forbes, supra note 2, at 676. However, it is still questionable (on both the
basis of policy in encouraging competitive sports, see Shapiro v. Queens County Jockey
Club, 53 N.Y.S.2d 135, 138-39 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1945), and the sophistication of technology)
as to whether such decisions should be reviewable by a court of law. See SPORTS AND LAW,
supra note 10, at 206 (stating that "[t]o permit sports officials to be sued in the absence of
strong evidence of fraud or corruption would seriously impair the ability of a sports official
to perform his task in an independent, professional and competent manner; it would also
threaten the integrity of all levels of athletic competition."). Perhaps the Shapiro court was
correct when it observed that the standard for such lawsuits challenging a game call should
be restricted to those instances when "bad faith" is alleged and proven. 53 N.Y.S.2d at 139.
One leading commentator agrees this is the correct position the courts should take. See
Narol, Protecting Rights, supra note 10, at 70-71 (stating that some "[c]ourts have dealt
with whether a cause of action exists against an official for honest error or misapplication of
[Vol. 11:375
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tort law. To recover in negligence, a plaintiff must prove the exis-
tence of a duty, a breach of that duty, the existence of a causal
connection between the alleged negligent conduct and the plain-
tiff's injury, 20 and damages resulting from such conduct.21 Addi-
tionally, if the person found to have committed the negligent act(s)
was in the employ of another, then his or her employer may also be
liable for damages under the theory of respondeat superior.22
Similarly, if the negligent actor was not an employee of an-
other but was acting as another's agent,'2 then liability may be im-
posed upon the actor's principal under the theory of vicarious lia-
bility.2 4 Conversely, a finding that a person was acting as an
independent contractor26 serves as an obstacle to these two theo-
ries of liability (respondeat superior or vicarious liability). In that
instance, the alleged tortfeasor begets no liability, subject to
exception.
In light of the foregoing, given that courts frequently charac-
terize a sports official as an "independent contractor," the tortious
doctrines of respondeat superior and vicarious liability will rarely
prevail against sports officials.
For general contractors, the rule is that an "owner or employer
a rule [and] have found that there is no justiciable controversy. These courts have held
correctly that judicial review will not be exercised."). But see Kelly, supra note 12, at 677-78
(questioning continued viability of early Australian cases denying liability of horse officials
for erroneous decisions but noting exceedingly difficult proof problems presented with liti-
gating such cases).
20. In some instances, a lack of causation argument can be sufficient to relieve a sports
official of liability. See, e.g., Pape v. State, 456 N.Y.S.2d 863, 864 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(finding cause of injury was not referee's failure to properly supervise intramural floor
hockey game, but rather injured plaintiff's scuffle with an opposing player).
21. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 164-65.
22. Id. at 499-508.
23. As a general matter, an agent is "[a] person authorized by another (principal) to
act for or in place of him; one entrusted with another's business." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
63 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). There are various ways in which a principal-agent rela-
tionship can arise. For example, this relationship can arise through actual authority which
is where the principal's words or conduct give a reasonable person in the agent's position the
belief that the agent is authorized to act on behalf of the principal. See generally RESTATE-
MNr (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 26 (1958). Additionally, a principal-agent relationship can arise
through apparent authority, where the principal's words or conduct give a third party a
reasonable belief that the agent has authority to act on behalf of the principle. Id. § 8.
Finally, a principal-agent relationship can arise through inherent authority. Id. § 8A.
24. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 508.
25. An "independent contractor" is "one who, in exercise of an independent employ-
ment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and is subject to his
employer's control only as to end product or final result of his work." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 770 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
For an excellent discussion of the nature of an independent contractor, see PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 16, at 509.
1994]
7
Biedzynski: Sports Officials Should Only Be Liable for Acts of Gross Negligen
Published by Institutional Repository, 1994
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
is not answerable for the acts of an independent contractor . . .
unless the case comes within one of the exceptions to the rule...
,"26 In the case of a municipality, for example, exceptions to this
rule include situations where the municipality controls the work of
the contractor, 7 where the municipality acts under a duty imposed
by statute, 8 where the city hires a contractor to perform work that
is either "inherently or intrinsically dangerous,"2 9 or where the city
employs a contractor to perform an unlawful act.
30
Obviously, most of these exceptions, aside from the "control"
exception, have little application to the case of a sports official.
Cases involving sports officials have primarily focused on the "con-
trol" exception to independent-contractor-based employer
immunity.31
Many courts conclude that where the school, entity, or institu-
tion does not retain some sort of control over the sports official, or
(depending on the jurisdiction) where the sports official is not act-
ing within the "ordinary course" of some sort of employment rela-
tionship, the sports official remains an "independent contractor"
and not an employee.32 Hence, despite isolated decisions holding
26. 18 JAMES PERKOWITZ-SOLHEIM ET AL., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 53.75.10, at 469 (3d ed. 1993) (footnotes omitted).
27. Id. § 53.76.10.
28. Id. § 53.76.20.
29. Id. § 53.76.30, at 480.
30. Id. § 53.76.40.
31. Similar cases involving athletic coaches have held as such. See, e.g., Lasseigne v.
Am. Legion, Post 38, 543 So.2d 1111, 1114 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding local post of na-
tional organization which organized baseball program was not liable for damages incurred to
minor player during practice allegedly caused by coach's negligence because coach was
"solely responsible" for occurrences during practices).
32. A majority of the cases deciding the "status" of sports officials as independent
contractors arose when the official attempted to collect workers' compensation benefits, and
not in the context of a negligence action. See, e.g., Farrar v. D.W. Daniel High Sch., 424
S.E.2d 543, 544 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992); Lynch v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 554
A.2d 159, 163 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 416 (Pa. 1990); Daniels v. Gates
Rubber Co., 479 P.2d 983, 985 (Colo. Ct. App. 1970); Gale v. Greater Washington Softball
Umpires Ass'n, 311 A.2d 817, 822 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973); Ehehalt v. Livingston Bd. of
Educ., 371 A.2d 752, 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (per curiam). In terms of workers'
compensation benefits claims brought by sports officials, "such recovery is rarely permitted"
because most courts deem the sports official to be an "independent contractor, [and] never
an employee of the officials' association nor of the educational institution at which he or she
officiates." SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10, at 193.
"Independent-contractor" status has also been litigated in the tort context. See, e.g.,
Kennel v. Carson City Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 376, 378 (D. Nev. 1990) (applying Nevada
law to find a school district not liable, where basketball player sued school district alleging
negligence of referees in failing to protect him from attack from opposing player, because
school district lacked "control" over how referee officiated game); Harvey v. Ouachita Parish
Sch. Bd., 545 So.2d 1241, 1243 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that because schools conducted
[Vol. 11:375
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otherwise,3 3 courts rarely apply the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior to find the school, entity, or municipality liable for the tortious
acts of the sports official."s A different situation presents itself
games and hired referees, referees were not agents or servants of athletic association despite
the association's training and testing).
However, as one commentator has asserted, a sports official can be both an independent
contractor and an employee for different purposes.
Unfortunately, the entire area of the legal status of the official as an indepen-
dent contractor or employee is fraught with an overriding misconception which
is held by many officials and administrators of officiating groups. The miscon-
ception takes the form of saying that officials working under any particular sys-
tem are either independent contractors or employees-for all purposes. This is
simply not true. . . . The point is, an athletic official may be an employee for
one legal purpose, and an independent contractor for another legal purpose or
situation.
GOLDBERGER, supra note 10, at 22. For purposes of assessing tort liability, however, the
finding that a sports official is an "employee" is critical for potentially holding the "em-
ployer" liable.
33. See, e.g., Ford v. Bonner County Sch. Dist., 612 P.2d 557 (Idaho 1980) (holding
high school football official who was accidently struck by player was employee of school
district because school district in fact had control over official). At least one commentator
has criticized Ford, arguing that the decision "does not contain sound reasoning." See
SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10, at 194. That author reasoned as follows:
It is incorrect that the school district had the right to "control and direct the
activities of the claimant" merely because the coach could have rejected Ford
[the sports official] as an official and he would not have officiated the game. This
is not the control test envisioned by states' workers' compensation laws. That
control is control of how the employee performs the work. In the context of
sports officiating, no one can control how a sports official works a game. To do so
would be the antithesis of a sports official. Once armored with the rules of the
sport, the sports official must then use reasoned judgment in the application of
the rules to the players' action.
Id. at 194-95. Compare Warthen v. Southeast Oklahoma State Univ., 641 P.2d 1125 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1982) (affirming award of death benefits for university teacher who, at the request
of the school's dean, had officiated a fraternity basketball game and then died of a heart
attack). In Warthen, the court applied the following test:
[W]e hold that the death or injury of a teacher engaged in an extracurricular
school activity is compensable . . . as long as the activity is sufficiently related
to the employment so as to supply the necessary causal connection between the
two. Factors to be applied in determining whether this connection is sufficient
include, but are not necessarily limited to, the degree to which the employee was
compelled, expected, pressured, requested, encouraged, or permitted to partici-
pate; the degree of employer sponsorship and control; other circumstances such
as whether the activity was regularly conducted on the work premises or during
lunch or recreational breaks; and the benefit derived from the activity by the
employer.
Id. at 1130 (citation omitted).
34. One court decided this issue in the context of a lawsuit brought against the State
of New York after a boxer died from injuries sustained during a bout at Madison Square
Garden's "Felt Forum." See Classen v. State, 500 N.Y.S.2d 460 (N.Y. Cl. Ct. 1985). In Clas-
sen, the decedent's spouse brought suit seeking damages for the negligence of several per-
sons involved with the fight including the referee and the ringside physicians. The court
relied upon Rosensweig v. State of New York, 158 N.E.2d 229 (N.Y. 1959), to hold that
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where the entity, a school or municipality, "furnished" the sports
official."
It is also important to recognize the defenses to a negligence
action, all of which may apply to sports officials. They include con-
tributory negligence,3 6 assumption of risk,
7 and lack of causation.3 8
neither the referee nor the physicians were employees of the State of New York. 500
N.Y.S.2d at 465. Rosensweig rested on the basis that while the State had chosen to heavily
regulate various aspects of the sport of boxing, it had nevertheless not subjected itself to
liability for the acts of the all the persons licensed and required to be present at such
events. Specifically, the court stated:
To be sure, the corporation promoting the contest was required to employ for
this purpose a physician included on the panel. This, without more, is a phe-
nomenon of everyday occurrence. No one would seriously suggest that every per-
son to whom the State has issued a license to practice his profession or trade
thereby becomes an employee or agent of the State. Nor is such a relationship
created by virtue of the fact that the State may also prescribe the amount of the
fee to be charged; regulation, no matter how close or stringent, is not thereby
transmuted into government operation.
158 N.E.2d at 232.
In a subsequent suit brought by the decedent's widow against the ringside physicians
and proprietor, another court similarly rejected claims that the proprietor was tortiously
responsible for the alleged negligent conduct of the fight's referee. The court based this
conclusion on the fact that the proprietor, Madison Square Garden, "neither participated in
the selection of the co-defendants [i.e., referee] nor provided them with training, instruction
or supervision." See Classen v. Izquierdo, 520 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1001 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
35. See Forkash v. City of New York, 277 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967)
(per curiam). In Forkash, two 18-year-old softball players collided when both players went
for a fly ball during a softball game. At the time of the incident, there was very little
daylight in the sky and one of the players had tripped on a piece of glass. Apparently, both
players had previously observed "shards of glass from numerous broken bottles; [and] that
prior to the game they [had] told a uniformed Park Department Supervisor, who was also
acting as umpire," about the field condition. Id. Apparently, the umpire had the infield
swept, but not the outfield. When the players once again complained, the umpire told them
"that the brooms had been put away, and 'it was getting dark and just get out there and
play.'" Id. The lower court dismissed the players' complaint for failure to state a claim.
However, the New York Appellate Division reversed that decision, finding that since the
"City [had] furnished the umpire, and the umpire-in baseball proverbially a dominating
and inflexible figure-[had] commanded the youths to continue play," the case should have
reached the jury. Id.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965) (defining contributory
negligence).
37. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 480. Assumption of the risk is probably
the most frequently asserted defense interposed in civil actions arising from sporting events.
Various forms of the defense exist. For example, there is "express" assumption of risk and
"implied" assumption of risk. See id. at 482, 484. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 496B (express assumption of risk); 496C (implied assumption of risk) (1965). Moreover,
in some jurisdictions, "implied" assumption of risk is further divided into "primary" and
"secondary" assumption of risk. "Primary" assumption of risk arises when the "defendant
was not negligent because he or she either owed no duty to the plaintiff or did not breach a
duty that was owed." John L. Diamond, Assumption of Risk after Comparative Negligence:
Integrating Contract Theory into Tort Doctrine, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 717, 731 (1991) (citing
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B. The Sports Official's Standard of Liability
According to some commentators, the sports official fulfills his
or her duty to participants and spectators by acting reasonably; in
the event the official does not act reasonably in supervising compe-
tition, for example, he or she should be held tortiously liable. In
other words,
[r]eferees and game officials need only use reasonable care to see
that the rules of competition are complied with. Reasonable care
might consist of advising the contestants about illegal holds,
punches, and similar tactics. Reasonable care will require refer-
ees to be diligent in detecting infractions of the rules and in
sanctioning violators. . . . Every situation is different, and in
evaluating a referee's conduct the law will judge it against that
of a reasonable and prudent person with similar training and
experience."
Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977)). "Secondary" implied assumption of risk
applies to situations "where the defendant has in fact breached his or her duty to the plain-
tiff." Id. "Secondary" implied assumption of risk can be further divided into "reasonable"
and "unreasonable" characterizations. Id. at 731-32. "Reasonable" secondary implied as-
sumption of risk occurs when "the utility of the conduct is so high in comparison with the
risk involved that it is reasonable for the plaintiff to encounter the risk; and the plaintiff is
actually aware of the risk and voluntarily encounters it." Samuel Frizell, Assumption Of
Risk In California: It's Time To Get Rid Of It, 16 W. ST. U. L. REv. 627, 631 (1989). Con-
versely, "unreasonable" implied secondary assumption of risk occurs when the conduct in
question, "in light of the risk to the plaintiff, is unreasonable, and . . . the plaintiff is actu-
ally aware of the risk and voluntarily encounters it . I..." d. at 630.
For the purposes of this Comment, the theoretical distinctions between the various
forms of assumption of risk and their survival following the advent of comparative negli-
gence (where adopted) is not treated herein. Thus, as used herein, "assumption of risk"
means a defense which completely bars or partially bars (depending upon whether the juris-
diction has adopted comparative negligence) a plaintiff's recovery where the plaintiff: (1)
voluntarily assumed the risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of a
defendant, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965); (2) knew of the risk of
harm created by the defendant's conduct and appreciated its "unreasonable character," id.
at § 496D; and (3) voluntarily accepted the risk. Id. at § 496E.
38. Lack of causation as a defense essentially involves the introduction of evidence
which shows either "unforeseeable consequences" or "intervening causes." See PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 16, at 280, 301. The defense of "unforeseeable consequences" holds that
"[ilf one could not reasonably foresee any injury as the result of one's act, or if one's con-
duct was reasonable in the light of what one could anticipate, there would be no negligence,
and no liability." Id. at 280 (footnote omitted). Under the "intervening causes" version of
the defense, the defendant escapes liability if the substantial contributing cause of plain-
tiff's injury was of "independent origin." Id. at 301. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 440 (1965).
39. SCHUBERT, supra note 10, at 232. See also GOLDBERGER, supra note 10, at 20,
wherein the author states:
In other words, the long and the short of it is that to minimize your exposure to
a costly and expensive lawsuit, you must act as a reasonably prudent official.
What is a reasonably prudent official? A reasonably prudent official
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Carabba v. Anacortes Sch. Dist. No. 1030 remains the "semi-
nal"4  case in support of a reasonableness standard for sports offi-
cials' liability. Carabba involved an action for damages brought
against a school district for a referee's negligent supervision of a
wrestling match. The referee allegedly failed to notice that one of
the participants used an illegal hold on the plaintiff. The court de-
scribed the referee's actions as follows:
Near the end of the third round of the match between these two
boys, Anderson [the opposing wrestler], who was well ahead on
points, was attempting to pin Stephen Carabba's [plaintiff's]
shoulders to the mat and thus score additional points for his
team. In the course of this attempt, he was alternating half nel-
sons, first to one side and then to the other, trying to roll
Carabba into a pin position. This process had taken the boys to
the north-west corner of the main mat near where small side
mats were placed against the main mat. The referee ... noticed
a separation between the main mat and the side mat, and moved
to close the gap to protect the contestants should they roll in
that direction and off the main mat onto the bare floor. In so
doing, his attention was diverted from the boys momentarily.
While the referee's attention was so diverted, Anderson ap-
plied what appeared to many of the eyewitnesses to be a full
nelson [the illegal hold]. The estimates made by the witnesses of
the length of time during which the full nelson was applied va-
ried from 1 to 10 or more seconds.
Almost simultaneously the buzzer sounded the end of the
round, the referee blew his whistle, and Anderson broke the hold
on Carabba after a final lunge. Carabba slumped to the mat, un-
- knows the rules that are designed to protect the players,
- knows his or her responsibility in enforcing these rules, [and]
- does not permit anyone to prevent him or her from doing his or her
job.
Id. Cf. CHAMPION, supra note 9, § 4:1, at 77 (stating in part that sports officials should
discharge their duty in a "non-negligent" manner, and that "[i]f this duty is ignored or not
performed properly, then . ..the referee ...might be liable for negligence"); Parvin,
supra note 10, at 20 (stating "[w]hen a referee's negligence is an actual and proximate cause
of harm, he should be held legally accountable" (footnote omitted)). See also Davis, supra
note 2, at 943-44 (arguing that the standard for liability should be negligence-based). But
see id. at 953 (suggesting that in team contact sports claims against sports officials for their
failure to control the players may only be actionable if it rises to a level of recklessness).
40. 435 P.2d 936 (Wash. 1967). Although some have posited that Carabba was the
pioneer decision citing ordinary negligence as the appropriate standard, this is not alto-
gether true. In fact, earlier cases had implied that the negligent act of a sports official could
result in liability. See, e.g., Kerby v. Elk Grove Union High Sch. Dist., 36 P.2d 431, 434 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1934) (dicta).
41. Some commentators have referred to Carabba in these terms. See Parvin, supra
note 10, at 11. This Comment argues that the case should not hold such stature.
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able to move due to the severance of a major portion of his spi-
nal cord resulting in permanent paralysis of all voluntary func-
tions below the level of his neck.42
After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the school
district and the court rejected plaintiff's requests for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial. The trial court then
dismissed the action. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court
reversed the trial court and remanded the matter for a new trial.43
In terms of the applicable standard of care owed by the refe-
ree to the participants, the court affirmed the lower court's appli-
cation of the reasonableness test." This holding has had its
critics.45
Other commentators take the position that the threshold for
civil liability (in cases not involving intentional torts), e should fo-
cus on recklessness rather than reasonableness.47 According to this
42. 435 P.2d at 939 (footnotes omitted).
43. The court reversed because of certain statements made by defense counsel during
the trial which it characterized as prejudicial. Id. at 946. Beyond this narrow holding, the
court's basis for reversal is unclear. It presumably found that the referee in this case was an
agent of the school and hence, if the referee was found to have been negligent, then this
negligence would be imputed to the school district. This conclusion is based upon the
court's reliance and citation to a section from the Restatement of Agency which described a
master's liability for its agent's failure to protect others from risks of harm when the master
was under a duty to do so. Id. at 947-48 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214
(1957)). However, the court also found that "it is clear that the wrestling matches were
conducted 'under the auspices' of the respondent school districts." Id. at 947 (footnote omit-
ted). It acknowledged plaintiff's argument that the school had a "nondelegable duty" to
protect the participants from harm. Id. at 946. Thus, the court's basis for holding the school
district liable for the referee's actions remains a mystery. As was examined supra at notes
27-37, there are several exceptions to the general rule that a school district or municipality
is not liable for the acts of independent contractors. However, in the case of sports officials,
the general rule has been that schools or municipalities are not liable for the official's acts.
44. Id. at 938 (noting that during deliberations, jury had requested instruction on
proper standard of care and that such standard was that of "the reasonably prudent man or
that of an ordinary prudent referee."). See also id. at 948 (concluding trial court's instruc-
tion on negligence of referee was proper).
45. See, e.g., Cameron Jay Rains, Sports Violence: A Matter of Societal Concern, 55
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 796, 808 (1980) (opining that Carabba's ordinary negligence standard
was inappropriate).
46. The "intentional" torts include assault, battery, and infliction of emotional dis-
tress. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13 and 18 (battery), § 21 (assault), § 35
(false imprisonment), and § 46 (outrageous conduct causing emotional distress) (1965).
47. See Lewis & Forbes, supra note 2, at 693 n.117. However, these same commenta-
tors also state that:
[t]he ordinary and prudent official should at least have knowledge of the rules of
the sport which he or she officiates. Such officials should also be versed in the
officially sanctioned interpretations of those rules. An official who lacks sufficient
knowledge of the rules breaches the official's general duty to know the rules.
Where the breach of this duty proximately causes harm to the plaintiff, the tort
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school of thought, an official is liable only for his or her reckless
acts or omissions. The state legislatures in those states which have
enacted statutes to deal with sports officials' civil liability, includ-
ing such states as Arkansas,4" Georgia,49
of negligence has occurred. In the instance of misapplication of a rule, the prob-
lem is not the official's lack of knowledge of the rules, but rather his administra-
tion of the rules' provisions. If the ordinary, reasonable and prudent official,
under similar circumstances, would not have made the error, a breach of the
standard of care occurs. This is often the situation in player injury cases where
sports officials are sued for malpractice.
Id. at 692 (footnotes omitted).
48. The Arkansas statute provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, no member of any board, com-
mission, agency, authority, or other governing body of any governmental entity
and no member of the board of directors of a nonprofit corporation that holds a
valid federal income tax exemption issued by the Internal Revenue Service shall
be held personally liable for damages resulting from:
(1) Any negligent act or omission of an employee of the nonprofit
corporation or governmental entity; or
(2) Any negligent act or omission of another director or member of
the governing body of the governmental entity.
(b) The same immunity provided by this chapter shall be extended to any ath-
letic official during the officiating of an interscholastic, intercollegiate, or any
other amateur athletic contest being conducted under the auspices of a nonprofit
or governmental entity. No official shall be held personally liable in any civil
action for damages to a player, participant, or spectator as a result of his acts of
commission or omission arising out of officiating duties and activities. Nothing in
this subsection shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person causing dam-
age by his malicious, willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-120-102 (Michie Supp. 1993).
49. The Georgia statute provides:
(a) Sports officials who officiate amateur athletic contests at any level of compe-
tition in this state shall not be liable to any person or entity in any civil actin for
injuries or damages claimed to have arisen by virtue of actions or inactions re-
lated in any manner to officiating duties within the confines of the athletic facil-
ity at which the athletic contest is played.
(b) For the purposes of this Code section,the term "sports officials" means:
(1) Those individuals who serve as referees, umpires, linesmen, and
those who serve in similar capacities but may be known by other ti-
tles and are duly registered with or are members of a local, state,
regional, or national organization which is engaged in part in provid-
ing education and training to sports officials; and
(2) Those individuals who render service without compensation as
manager, coach, instructor, or assistant manager, coach, or instructor
in any system of supervised recreation established pursuant to Chap-
ter 64 of Tile 36.
(c) Nothing in this Code section shall be deemed to grant the protection set
forth in subsection (a) of this Code section to sports officials who cause injury or
damage to a person or entity by actions or inactions which are intentional, will-
ful, wanton, reckless, malicious, or grossly negligent.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-41 (Michie Supp. 1993).
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Indiana,5"
50. The Indiana statute provides, in pertinent part:
Sec. 1. As used in this chapter, "compensation" does not include the following:
(1) Reimbursement or payment of reasonable expenses incurred for
the benefit of a sports or leisure activity.
(2) Any award, meal, or other gift that does not exceed one hundred
dollars ($100) in value and is given as a token of appreciation or
recognition.
(3) Any per diem payment that does not exceed fifty dollars ($50) for
personal services as a referee, umpire, judge, or assistant to a referee,
umpire, or judge.
Sec. 2. As used in this chapter, "sports or leisure activity" means:
(1) an athletic or sports competition, exhibition, or event; and
(2) an activity conducted for a recreational purpose.
Sec. 3. As used in this chapter, "volunteer" means an individual who, without
compensation, engages in or provides other personal services for a sports or lei-
sure activity such as baseball, basketball, football, soccer, hockey, volleyball,
cheerleading, or other similar sports or leisure activities involving children who
are less than sixteen (16) years of age.
Sec. 4. This chapter does not grant immunity from civil liability to a person who
engaged in intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless behavior....
Sec. 6. A volunteer is not liable for civil damages that are proximately caused by
a negligent act or omission in the personal services provided by:
(1) the volunteer; or
(2) another person selected, trained, supervised, or otherwise under
the control of the volunteer;
in the course of a sports or leisure activity.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-11.8-1 to 118.8-4 and 34-4-11.8-6 (West Supp. 1993).
(1) Reimbursement or payment of reasonable expenses incurred for the benefit
of a sports or leisure activity.
(2) Any award, meal, or other gift that does not exceed one hundred dollars
($100) in value and is given as a token of appreciation or recognition.
(3) Any per diem payment that does not exceed fifty dollars ($50) for personal
services as a referee, umpire, judge, or assistant to a referee, umpire, or judge.
Sec. 2. As used in this chapter, "sports or leisure activity" means:
(1) an athletic or sports competition, exhibition, or event; and
(2) an activity conducted for a recreational purpose.
Sec. 3. As used in this chapter, "volunteer" means an individual who, without
compensation, engages in or provides other personal services for a sports or lei-
sure activity such as baseball, basketball, football, soccer, hockey, volleyball,
cheerleading, or other similar sports or leisure activities involving children who
are less than sixteen (16) years of age.
Sec. 4. This chapter does not grant immunity from civil liability to a person who
engaged in intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless behavior....
Sec. 6. A volunteer is not liable for civil damages that are proximately caused by
a negligent act or omission in the personal services provided by:
(1) the volunteer; or
(2) another person selected, trained, supervised, or otherwise under
the control of the volunteer;
in the course of a sports or leisure activity.
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-11.8-1 to 118.8-4 and 34-4-11.8-6 (West Supp. 1993).
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Louisiana, 1 Illinois,"2
51. The Louisiana statute provides:
A. Except as provided in Subsection B of this Section, no person shall have a
cause of action against any volunteer athletic coach, manager, team physician, or
sports team official for any loss or damage caused by any act or omission to act
directly related to his responsibilities as a coach, manager, team physician, or
official, while actively directing or participating in the sporting activities or in
the practice thereof, unless the loss or damage was caused by the gross negli-
gence of the coach, manager, team physician, or official.
B. Subsection A of this Section shall not be applicable unless the volunteer ath-
letic coach, manager, team physician, or sports team official has participated in a
safety orientation and training program established by the league or team with
which he is affiliated. Participation in a safety orientation and training program
by a coach, manager, team physician, or sports team official may be waived by
the league prior to the individual's participation in the sporting activities or in
the practice thereof upon submission of appropriate documented evidence as to
that individual's proficiency in first aid, and safety. A person who has been
tested or trained, and sanctioned or admitted by a recognized league or associa-
tion, shall be deemed to be in compliance with this Subsection. However, com-
pliance with the requirements of this Subsection shall not be construed to create
or impose on the volunteer any additional liability or higher standard of care
based on participation in safety orientation and training or evidence of profi-
ciency in first aid and safety.
C. The receipt of a small stipend or incidental compensation for volunteer ser-
vices shall not exclude any person, who is otherwise covered, from the limitation
of liability provided in Subsection A.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2798 (West 1991).
52. The Illinois statute provides:
Section 1. Manager, coach, umpire or referee negligence standard.
(a) General rule. Except as provided otherwise in this Section, no
person who, without compensation and as a volunteer, renders ser-
vices as a manager, coach, instructor, umpire or referee or who, with-
out compensation and as a volunteer,assists a manager, coach, in-
structor, umpire or referee in a sports program of a nonprofit
association, shall be liable to any person for any civil damages as a
result of any acts or omissions in rendering such services or con-
ducting or sponsoring such sports program, unless the conduct of
such person falls substantially below the standards generally prac-
ticed and accepted in like circumstances by similar persons rendering
such services or conducting or sponsoring such sports programs,and
unless it is shown that such person did an act or omitted the doing of
an act which such person was under a recognized duty to another to
do, knowing or having reason to know that such act or omission cre-
ated a substantial risk of actual harm to the person or property of
another. It shall be insufficient to impose liability to establish only
that the conduct of such person fell below ordinary standards of care.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as affecting or
modifying the liability of such person or a nonprofit associa-
tion for any of the following:
(ii) acts or omissions relating to the care and maintenance
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Maryland,53
of real estate unrelated to the practice or playing areas which
such persons or nonprofit associations own, possess or control.
(2) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as affecting or
modifying any existing legal basis for determining the liability,
or any defense thereto, of any person not covered by the stan-
dard of negligence established by this Section.
(c) Assumption of risk or comparative fault. Nothing in this Section
shall be construed as affecting or modifying the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk or comparative fault on the part of the participant.
(d) Definitions. As used in this Act the following words an phrases
shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
"Compensation" means any payment for services per-
formed but does not include reimbursement for reasonable ex-
penses actually incurred or to be incurred or, solely in the case
of umpires or referees, a modest honorarium.
"Nonprofit association" means an entity which is organ-
ized as a not-for-profit corporation under the laws of this
State or the United States or a nonprofit unincorporated asso-
ciation or any entity which is authorized to do business in this
State as a not-for-profit corporation under the laws of this
State, including, but not limited to, youth or athletic associa-
tions, volunteer fire, ambulance, religious, charitable, frater-
nal, veterans, civic, county fair or agricultural associations, or
any separately chartered auxiliary of the foregoing, if organ-
ized and operated on a nonprofit basis.
"Sports program" means baseball (including softball),
football, basketball, soccer or any other competitive sport for-
mally recognized as a sport by the United States Olympic
Committee as specified by and under the jurisdiction of the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978 (36 U.S.C. 371 et. seq.), the Ama-
teur Athletic Union or the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation. The term shall be limited to a program or that portion
of a program that is organized for recreational purposes and
whose activities are substantially for such purposes and which
is primarily for participants who are 18 years of age or
younger or whose 19th birthday occurs during the year of par-
ticipation or the competitive season, whichever is longer.
There shall, however, be no age limitation for programs oper-
ated for the physically handicapped or mentally retarded.
(e) Nothing in this Section is intended to bar any cause of action
against a nonprofit association or change the liability of such an asso-
ciation which arises out of an act or omission of any person exempt
from liability under this Act.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 745, para. 80/1 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
53. The Maryland statute provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Definitions. . ..
(4) "Athletic official" means an individual who officiates, referees, or
umpires an interscholastic, intercollegiate, or any other amateur ath-
letic contest conducted by a nonprofit or governmental body.
(d) Liability of athletic official.-(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, an athletic official is not personally liable in damages in any civil
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Massachusetts,54
action brought against the athletic official by a player, a participant, or a specta-
tor by virtue of the athletic official's act or omission arising out of the athletic
official's duties and services performed while acting in the capacity of athletic
official.
(2) An athletic official is personally liable for damages in any civil
action brought against the athletic official in which it is found that
the damages were the result of the athletic official's willful, wanton,
or grossly negligent act or omission.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. AND JUD. PROC. § 5-313 (1989).
54. The Massachusetts statute provides:
As used in this section, unless the context requires otherwise, the following
words shall have the following meanings:
"Compensation," shall not include reimbursement for reasonable expenses
actually incurred or to be incurred or, in the case of umpires or referees, a mod-
est honorarium.
"Nonprofit association," an entity which is organized as a nonprofit corpora-
tion or nonprofit unincorporated association under the laws of the common-
wealth or the United States or any entity which is authorized to do business in
the commonwealth as a nonprofit corporation or unincorporated association
under the laws of the commonwealth.
"Sports program," baseball, softball, football, basketball, soccer and any
other competitive sport formally recognized as a sport by the United States
Olympic Committee as specified by and under the jurisdiction of. . . the Ama-
teur Athletic Union or the National Collegiate Athletic Association. It shall be
limited to a program or that portion Iof a program that is organized for recrea-
tional purposes and whose activities are substantially for such purposes and
which is primarily for participants who are eighteen years of age or younger
whose nineteenth birthday occurs during the year of participation or the com-
petitive season, whichever is longer; provided, however, that there shall be no
age limitation for programs operated for the physically handicapped or mentally
retarded.
Except as otherwise provided, in this section, no person who without compensa-
tion and as a volunteer, renders services as a manager, coach, umpire or referee
or as an assistant to a manager or coach in a sports program of a nonprofit asso-
ciation . . . shall be liable to any person for any action in tort as a result of any
acts or failures to act in rendering such services or in conducting such sports
program. The immunity conferred by this section shall not apply to any acts or
failures to act intentionally designed to harm, or to any grossly negligent acts or
failures to act which result in harm to the person. Nothing in this section shall
be construed to affect or modify any existing legal basis for determining the lia-
bility, or any defense thereto, of any person not covered by the immunity con-
ferred by this section.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect or modify the liability of
a person or nonprofit association for any of the following:
(i) acts or failures to act which are committed in the course of activi-
ties primarily commercial in nature even though carried on to obtain
revenue for maintaining the sports program or revenue used for
other charitable purposes.
(ii) any acts or failures to act relating to the transportation of par-
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Minnesota,55 Mississippi,56  Nebraska s5 Nevada,58  New Jersey,"
(iii) acts or failures to act relating to the care and maintenance of
real estate which such persons or nonprofit associations own, possess
or control and which is used in connection with a sports program and
or any other nonprofit association activity.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85V (West 1993).
55. The Minnesota statute provides:
Subdivision 1. Grant. No individual who provides services or assistance without
compensation as an athletic coach, manager, or official for a sports team that is
organized or performing under a nonprofit charter, and no community-based,
voluntary nonprofit athletic association, or any volunteer of the nonprofit ath-
letic association, is liable for money damaged to a player, participant, or specta-
tor as a result of an individual's acts or omissions in the providing of that service
or assistance.
This section applies to organized sports competitions and practice and in-
struction in that sport.
For purposes of this section, "compensation" does not include reimburse-
ment for expenses.
Subd. 2. Limitation. Subdivision 1 does not apply:
(1) to the extent that the acts or omissions are covered under an
insurance policy issued to the entity for whom the coach, manager, or
official serves;
(2) if the individual acts in a willful and wanton or reckless manner
in providing the services or assistance;
(3) if the acts or omissions arise out of the operation, maintenance,
or use of a motor vehicle;
(4) to an athletic coach, manager, or official who provides services or
assistance as part of a public or private educational institution's ath-
letic program; and
(5) if the individual acts in violation of federal, state, or local law.
The limitation in clause (1) constitutes a waiver of the defense of immunity to
the extent of the liability stated in the policy, but has no effect on the liability of
the individual beyond the coverage provided.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.08 (West 1994).
56. The Mississippi statute provides:
(1) Sports officials who officiate athletic contests at any level of competition in
this state shall not be liable to any person or entity in any civil action for inju-
ries or damages claimed to have arisen by virtue of actions or inactions related
in any manner to officiating duties within the confines of the athletic facility at
which the athletic contest is played.
(2) For purposes of this section, sports officials are defined as those individuals
who serve as referees, umpires, linesmen and those who serve in similar capaci-
ties but may be known by other titles and are duly registered members of a
local, state, regional or national organization which is engaged in part in provid-
ing education and training to sports officials.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant the protection set forth to
sports officials who cause injury or damage to a person or entity be actions or
inactions which are intentional, willful, wanton, reckless, malicious or grossly
negligent.
(4) The provisions of this section shall apply only to actions the cause of which
accrued on or after July 1, 1988.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 95-9-3 (1993).
57. The Nebraska statutes provide, in pertinent part:
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25-21, 195. Legislative findings. The Legislature finds and declares it is in the
public interest that there be adequate nonprofit sports programs available
within the State of Nebraska.
25-21, 196. Terms, defined. . . . [U]nless the context otherwise requires:
(1) Compensation shall not include:
(a) Gifts not exceeding a total value of one hundred dollars in
any twelve consecutive months; or
(b) Any reimbursement for any reasonable expense incurred
for the benefit of a nonprofit sports program;
(2) Duty shall mean any activity normally performed by an individ-
ual while acting as a member of the qualified staff;
(3) Member of the qualified staff shall mean any individual who:
(a) Is a manager, coach, umpire, or referee; or
(b) Is an assistant to a manager, coach, umpire, or referee; or
(c) Prepares any playing field for any practice session or any
formal game;
(4) Negligent act or omission shall not include any reckless, willful,
wanton, or grossly negligent act or omission;
(5) Nonprofit sports program shall mean any program, whether or
not it is registered with or recognized by this state or any political
subdivision of this state:
(a) That is a sports program organized for recreational pur-
poses and the activities of which are principally for such pur-
poses; and
(b) No part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any person; and
(6) Person shall include bodies politic and corporate, societies, com-
munities, the public generally, partnerships, individuals, joint-stock
companies, and associations.
25-21, 197. Member of the qualified staff; liability for damages; immunity. Any
individual who renders services without compensation as a member of the quali-
fied staff of a nonprofit sports program shall not be liable under the laws of this
state for civil damages resulting from any negligent act or omission of such qual-
ified member occurring in the performance of any duty of such qualified
member.
25-21, 198. Liability statement; furnish to participant. Any person who sponsors,
organizes, or causes a nonprofit sports program to operate shall give the parent
or guardian of any minor who participates in such a program a written state-
ment in the following form:
Coaches, managers, umpires, referees, their assistants, or anyone who
prepares any playing field shall NOT be liable for the injury or death of any
participant in (name of activity or program) which results from the negligence of
any of the above-listed individuals.
The provisions of section 25-21,197 shall not apply to any individual unless
a copy of such statement signed by the parent or guardian is retained by the
person who sponsors, organizes, or causes the affected sports program to operate.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 195, 196, 197, 198 (1989).
58. The Nevada statute provides:
1. A sports official who officiates a sporting event at any level of competition in
this state is not liable for any civil damages as a result of any unintended act or
omission, not amounting to gross negligence, by him in the execution of his offi-
ciating duties within the facility where the sporting event takes place.
2. As used in this section:
(a) "Sporting event" means any contest, game or other event involv-
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ing the athletic or physical skills of amateur or professional athletes.
(b) "Sports official" means any person who serves as a referee, um-
pire, linesmen or in a similar capacity, whether paid or unpaid.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.630 (Michie 1993).
59. The New Jersey statutes provide:
2A: 62A-6. a. Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, no person
who provides services or assistance free of charge, except for reimbursement of
expenses, as an athletic coach, manager, or official, other than a sports official
accredited by a voluntary association as provided by P.L. 1979, c. 172 (C.18A:11-
3) and exempted from liability pursuant to P.L. 1987, c. 239 (C.2A:62A-61), for a
sports team which is organized or performing pursuant to a nonprofit or similar
charter or which is a member team in a league organized by or affiliated with a
county or municipal recreation department, shall be liable in any civil action for
damages to a player or participant or spectator as a result of his acts of commis-
sion or omission arising out of and in the course of his rendering that service or
assistance.
b. The provisions of subsection a. of this section shall apply not only to organ-
ized sports competitions, but shall also apply to practice and instruction in that
sport.
C.
(1) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any
person causing damage by his willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act
of commission or omission, nor to any coach, manager, or official who
has not participated in a safety orientation and training skills pro-
gram which program shall include but not be limited to injury pre-
vention and first aid procedures and general coaching concepts.
(2) A coach, manager, or official shall be deemed to have satisfied the
requirements of this subsection if the safety orientation and skills
training program attended by the person has met the minimum stan-
dards established by the Governor's Council on Physical Fitness and
Sports in consultation with the Bureau of Recreation within the De-
partment of Community Affairs in accordance with rules and regula-
tions adopted pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act", P.L.
1968, c. 410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.).
d. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person
causing damage as the result of his negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
e. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to any person for
any damage caused by that person permitting a sports competition or practice to
be conducted without supervision.
f. Nothing in this act shall apply to an athletic coach, manager, or official who
provides services or assistance as part of a public or private educational institu-
tion's athletic program.
2A:62A-6.1. Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, a person who
is accredited as a sports official by a voluntary association as provided by P.L.
1979, c. 172 (C.18A:11-3) and who serves that association, a conference under the
jurisdiction of the association, or a public entity as defined in Title 59 of the
New Jersey Statutes in the capacity of a sport official, whether or not compen-
sated for his services, shall not be liable in any action for damages as a result of
his acts of commission or omission arising out of and in the course of his render-
ing the services. Nothing in this act shall be deemed to grant immunity to any
person causing damage by his willful, wanton, or grossly negligent act of com-
mission or omission, nor to any person causing damage as the result of his negli-
gent operation of a motor vehicle.
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:62A-6, 2A:62A-6.1 (West Supp. 1994). New Jersey's statute was
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North Dakota,60 Pennsylvania,6 Rhode Island,62
prompted "[in evident response to the increasing cost of liability insurance and, in some
instances the unavailability of liability insurance, for volunteer athletic coaches, managers
and officials of nonprofit sports teams .... " Byrne v. Boys Baseball League, 564 A.2d 1222,
1223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (citation and footnote omitted). See also, Christopher
A. Terzian, Tort Liability- Athletic Coaches and Officials-Volunteers-Civil Immunity
from Liability-to be codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:62A-6, 10 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 332
(1987).
60. The North Dakota statute provides:
1. Any person who provides services or assistance free of charge, except for reim-
bursement of expenses, as an athletic coach, manager, or official for a sports
team which is organized or performing pursuant to a nonprofit or similar charter
is immune from civil liability for any act or omission resulting in damage or
injury to a player or participant if at the time of the act or omission all the
following are met:
a. The person who caused the damage or injury was acting in good
faith, in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary care, and in the
scope of that person's duties for the sports team.
b. The act or omission did not constitute willful misconduct or gross
negligence.
c. The coach, manager, or official had participated in a safety orien-
tation and training program established by the league or team with
which the person is affiliated.
2. This section does not grant immunity to:
a. Any person causing damage as the result of the negligent operation
of a motor vehicle.
b. Any person for any damage caused by that person permitting a
sports competition or practice to be conducted without supervision.
c. Any athletic coach, manager, or official providing service as a part
of a public or private educational institution's athletic program.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-46 (1993).
61. In pertinent part, the Pennsylvania statute provides:
(a) General Rule.-Except as provided otherwise in this section, no person who,
without compensation and as a volunteer, renders services as a manager, coach,
instructor, umpire or referee or who, without compensation and as a volunteer,
assists a manager, coach, instructor, umpire or referee in a sports program of a
nonprofit association, and no nonprofit association, or any officer or employee
thereof, conducting or sponsoring a sports program, shall be liable to any person
for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions in rendering such ser-
vices or in conducting or sponsoring such sports program, unless the conduct of
such person or nonprofit association falls substantially below the standards gen-
erally practiced and accepted in like circumstances by similar persons or similar
nonprofit associations rendering such services or conducting or sponsoring such
sports programs, and unless it is shown that such person or nonprofit association
did an act or omitted the doing of an act which such person or nonprofit associa-
tion was under a recognized duty to another to do, knowing or having reason to
know that such act or omission created a substantial risk of actual harm to the
person or property of another. It shall be insufficient to impose liability to estab-
lish only that the conduct of such person or nonprofit association fell below ordi-
nary standards of care.
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8332.1(a) (1993).
62. The Rhode Island statue provides:
Immunity from civil liability - sports teams.
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and Tennessee, 3 all agree with this view. They uniformly take the
(a) Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, ex-
cept as otherwise provided in subsection(c) of this section, no person,
who, without compensation and as a volunteer, renders services as a
manager, coach, instructor, umpire, referee or official or who without
compensation and as a volunteer, assists a manager, coach, instruc-
tor, umpire, referee or official in a youth sports program organized
and conducted by or under the auspices of a non-profit corporation,
and no director, trustee, officer, or employee of a non-profit corpora-
tion which organizes, conducts, or sponsors a youth sports program,
shall be liable to any person for any civil damages as a result of any
acts or omissions in the rendering of such services or assistance or in
the organization, conduct or sponsorship of such youth sports pro-
gram unless the acts or omissions of such person were committed in
wilful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of the participants
in such youth sports program. It shall be insufficient to impose liabil-
ity upon any such person to establish only that the conduct of such
person fell below ordinary standards of care.
(b) Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary except
as otherwise provided in subsection (c) of this section, no person who
renders services as a manager, coach, instructor, umpire, referee or
official or who assists a manager, coach, instructor, umpire, referee or
official in an interscholastic or intramural sports program organized
and conducted in accordance with and subject to the rules, regula-
tions and jurisdiction of the Rhode Island Interscholastic League, the
Committee on Junior High School Athletics, and/or the Board of Re-
gents for Elementary and Secondary Education shall be liable to any
person for any civil damages as a result of any acts or omissions in
the rendering of such services or assistance unless the acts or omis-
sions of such person were committed in wilful, wanton or reckless
disregard for the safety of the participants in such interscholastic or
intramural sports program.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to grant immunity to
any person, corporation or to another entity who or which causes in-
jury or damage as the result of the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle.
(d) For purposes of this section: ...
(ii) The term "compensation" shall not include reim-
bursement for reasonable expenses actually incurred or to be
incurred or, solely in the case of umpires, referees, or other
game officials, a modest honorarium.
(iii) The term "non-profit corporation" shall include any
non-profit corporation or non-profit association organized
under the law of this state, or of any other state, or of the
United States, which is authorized to do business in this state.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-48 (1993).
63. The Tennessee statutes provide:
62-50-201. As used in this part, unless the context otherwise requires, "sports
official" means any person who serves as referee, umpire, linesman or in any
similar capacity in supervising or administering a sports event and who is regis-
tered as a member of a local, state, regional or national organization which pro-
vides training and educational opportunities for sports officials.
62-50-202. A sports official who administers or supervises a sports event at any
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position that the civil threshold for liability should either be gross
negligence or recklessness.4
The National Association of Sports Officials, a leading organi-
zation advocating the rights of sports officials, also supports the
gross negligence/recklessness standard, and has vigorously argued
for adoption of similar legislation by all states.6 As the preceding
level of competition is not liable to any person or entity in any civil action for
damages to a player, participant or spectator as a result of the sports official's
act of commission or omission arising out of the sports official's duties or
activities.
62-50-203. Nothing in this part grants civil immunity to a sports official who
intentionally or by gross negligence inflicts injury or damage to a person or
entity.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-50-201, 202, 203 (1990).
64. For a definition of "gross negligence," see supra note 16. "Recklessness," with re-
gard to tort liability, can be defined as follows:
The usual meaning assigned to "willful," "wanton," or "reckless," according
to taste as to the word used, is that the actor has intentionally done an act of an
unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great
as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which thus is usually
accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences ...
The result is that "willful," "wanton," or "reckless" conduct tends to take
on the aspect of highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure
from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 16, at 213, 214 (footnotes omitted).
As is clear from these definitions, the two terms are nearly synonymous, and both con-
template a considerable departure from the norms of "ordinary" negligence. Id. at 214 ("As
a result there is often no clear distinction at all between such [reckless] conduct and 'gross'
negligence, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning, of an aggra-
vated form of negligence, differing in quality rather than in degree from ordinary lack of
care." (footnote omitted)).
65. The National Association of Sports Officials (NASO) has promulgated model legis-
lation dealing with various issues affecting sports officials. For example, NASO offers model
legislation relating to the criminal offenses committed against sports officials. Specifically
the model legislation provides:
Section 1. Any person who physically assaults any sports official at any level of
competition, within the confines or immediate vicinity of the athletic facility at
which the athletic contest in which a sports official was an active participant
shall be guilty of a crime (misdemeanor, felony, etc.) which shall be punishable
by a fine of $10,000 and/or imprisonment to a maximum of three year(s).
National Association of Sports Officials, Model Legislation on Criminal Offenses to Physi-
cally Assault Sports Officials (on file with the University of Miami Entertainment & Sports
Law Review).
With respect to the civil liability of sports officials, NASO has suggested the following
model statute:
Section 1. Sports officials who officiate athletic contests at any level of competi-
tion in this State shall not be liable to any person or entity in any civil action for
injuries or damages claimed to have arisen by virtue of actions or inactions re-
lated in any manner to officiating duties within the confines of the athletic facil-
ity at which the athletic contest is played.
Section 2. Sports officials are defined as those individuals who serve as referees,
umpires, linesman, and those who serve in similar capacities that may be known
[Vol. 11:375
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statutes make clear, their campaign appears to be successful.
Recent case law addressing claims against sports officials for
negligent supervision or control6 further supports gross negligence
or recklessness as the proper standard to be applied to such
claims.67 Kline v. OID Assocs., Inc.as illustrates the application of a
gross negligence or recklessness standard.
In Kline, a soccer player, who was kicked by another player
while he held the ball, sued soccer officials6" for their negligence
and reckless conduct. At trial, the defendants succeeded in ob-
taining a summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed this decision
to the Ohio Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court errone-
ously applied a recklessness or intentional-acts standard of care in
granting the summary judgment.70 The Ohio Court of Appeals re-
jected the claimant's argument based on the following test for
by other titles and are duly registered or members of a local, state, regional or
national organization which is engaged in part in providing education and train-
ing to sports officials.
Section 3. Nothing in this law shall be deemed to grant the protection set forth
to sports officials who cause injury or damage to a person or entity by actions or
inactions which are intentional, wilful, wanton, reckless, maliciously or grossly
negligent.
National Association of Sports Officials, Model Legislation on Criminal Offenses to Physi-
cally Assault Sports Officials (on file with the University of Miami Entertainment & Sports
Law Review).
66. In negligent supervision or negligent control cases:
A sports official may be liable for injuries to a participant by failing to observe
that the participant is seriously injured or in danger of being seriously injured
and not stopping the athletic contest. This is especially true in the strong con-
tact sports of boxing, wrestling and football. Other liabilities may include negli-
gent supervision and failure to control the contest.
SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10, at 200.
67. Of course, negligent supervision or control is not the only basis for claims against
sports officials. Various theories of negligence against sports officials have been alleged,
including:
falling to supervise athletes resulting in injury - producing fights or rough play;
falling to enforce safety rules, such as prohibition of ban equipment or the use of
manipulated equipment, and starting or continuing a game when whether or
field conditions are not safe, for instance, when a field is muddy or rocky, a court
slippery or like in present [have also been alleged] . . . [additionally,] there is
also another form of negligent conduct which has been alleged which is [a failing
to warn participants of their risk of injury].
Brooks, supra note 6, at 763.
With respect to an official's duty to inspect a participant's equipment, see Collins v.
Resto, 746 F. Supp. 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rejecting a claim that a boxing referee had a duty
to inspect boxers' gloves beyond that provided under New York law).
68. 609 N.E.2d 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992).
69. The claimant had also sued player who had committed the injury, the owner of the
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claims of negligent supervision:
In a case involving one player against another, the Supreme
Court of Ohio determined that before a party may proceed with
a cause of action involving injury resulting from a recreational or
sports activity, reckless or intentional misconduct must exist.
7 1
Whether the game is organized, unorganized, supervised or un-
supervised, the standard of liability remains the same. Such a
standard strikes a balance between encouraging vigorous and
free participation in recreational or sports activities, while en-
suring the safety of the players. The same logic and standard
should apply to nonparticipants involved in the game, unless
there is evidence of negligent supervision. To successfully state
a cause of action under the theory of negligent supervision, the
party must produce evidence such as a defendant allowing a
player with a known propensity toward violence to play or al-
lowing a team to play when there was a total absence of
management.2
In applying this standard to the facts of the case, the court
concluded, with respect to the claims against the referee, that the
plaintiff had "failed to provide any evidence that [the] [r]eferee
.. .had superior knowledge [compared to that of the claimants, or
the other players, of the aggressiveness of the game or the propen-
sity of one player to engage in violence] .. .and either recklessly
or negligently allowed the game to be continued." 3 Additionally,
the court found that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury
arising from the ordinary course of the game, which in this case
involved, by definition, kicking. 4
Therefore, Kline stands for the proposition that when a plain-
tiff sues a sports official for his or her negligence in failing to prop-
erly supervise or control a game or sporting event, the standard of
71. Here, the court was referring to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Marchetti v.
Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699, reh'g denied, 562 N.E.2d 163 (Ohio 1990). In Marchetti, the plain-
tiff, a 13-year-old girl, had broken her leg while playing the popular children's game "kick
the can." At trial the defendant, a minor girl who had collided with the plaintiff during the
game, was successful in getting her motion for summary judgment granted under the pre-
mise that the plaintiff could not recover for her injuries without a showing of "an inten-
tional tort." Id. at 700. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause for a
finding as to whether the plaintiff consented to the conduct which caused her injury. On
appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, the court reversed and held that "we join the weight of
authority. . . and require that before a party may proceed with a cause of action involving
injury resulting from a recreational or sports activity, reckless or intentional conduct must
exist." Id. at 703 (footnote omitted).
72. 609 N.E.2d at 565 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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liability is recklessness or gross negligence. This standard has been




In certain circumstances, spectators will have a cause of action
against sports officials. 6 Potential liability for spectator injuries
has been a problem for quite some time. For example, there is a
plethora of case law involving spectators who have been injured at
such events as auto racing 78 baseball,7 9 basketball, 80 bowling,8
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Day, 588 N.E.2d 973 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (apply-
ing similar test as in Kline, finding that plaintiff had failed to establish prior examples of
attacker's violent behavior or coach's prior knowledge of such behavior, and thus holding
coach not liable for plaintiff's injuries); Nydegger v. Don Bosco Prepatory High Sch., 495
A.2d 485, 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985) (holding that absent evidence of coach's "in-
struction" to players to commit wrongful act, coach was not liable for injuries). Cf. Laiche v.
Kohen, 621 So.2d 1162, 1165 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (holding elementary school
football coach not liable for injuries sustained to eighth grade player who weighed 110
pounds by another eighth grade player who weighed 270 pounds during scrimmage because
coach did not act unreasonably).
76. Although this discussion pertains to spectators' claimed physical injuries, commen-
tators note that spectator suits based on economic injury are also plausible. See, e.g., Lewis
& Forbes, supra note 2, at 674. However, as discussed, these lawsuits have not been success-
ful. See supra, note 19 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Walter T. Champion, Jr., "At the Ol' Ball Game" and Beyond: Specta-
tors and the Potential for Liability, 14 J. TRIMAL ADvoc. 495 (1991); Bruno Colapietro, Com-
ment, The Promoters' Liability For Sports Spectator Injuries, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 140 (1960);
Gerald Dworkin, Injuries To Spectators In The Course Of Sporting Activities, 25 MOD. L.
REV. 738 (1962); Howard Jeffers, Note, Theaters And Shows-Amusements-Negligence,
11 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 93 (1935); John Hall, Torts-Voluntary Assumption Of
Risk-Contributory Negligence-Injuries To Patrons At Places Of Amusement, 10 S. CAL.
L. REv. 67 (1936); Hugh F. Mullin, Note, The Perils Of Being A Spectator, 2 LINCOLN L.
REV. 75 (1966); Sanford M. Pooler et. al., Note, A Survey Of The Law On Injuries To
Spectators, 39 B.U. L. REV. 53 (1959); Gary E. Siskind, Note, Liability For Injuries To
Spectators, 6 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 305 (1968); Carlos Solis, Sports Spectators-The Uncom-
pensated Injury Victims, 2 U.S.F. L. REV. 114 (1967); Carl Zollmann, Injuries From Flying
Baseballs To Spectators At Baseball Games, 24 MARQ. L. REV. 198 (1940); Recent
Cases-Negligence-Landowners-Duty Of Baseball Club To Protect Invitees From Inju-
rious Acts Of Third Parties, 12 VAND. L. REV. 299 (1958); Current Topics And Notes-The
Baseball Fan And The Duty To Protect Him, 54 AM. L. REV. 433 (1920); Note and Com-
ment, Negligence-Theaters and Shows-Assumption Of Risk-Spectators At A Baseball
Game, 17 MICH. L. REV. 594 (1919); Note, Duty Of Proprietors Of Theaters, Amusement
Gardens, etc., As To Safety Of Patrons, 69 CENr. L. J. 250 (1909).
78. See, eg., Brown v. Flying Wheels Motorcross Club, 569 So.2d 313 (Ala. 1990); East
Bay Raceway v. Parham, 497 So.2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Pack v. Santa Fe Enters., Inc.,
568 N.E.2d 360 (I1. App. Ct. 1991); Merritt v. Nickelson, 287 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. 1980)
(drag racing); Cortwright v. Brewerton Int'l Speedway, Inc., 539 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989).
79. See, e.g., Bellezzo v. State, 851 P.2d 847 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Neinstein v. Los
Angeles Dodgers, Inc., 229 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Rudnick v. Golden West
Broadcasters, 202 Cal. Rptr. 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Brown v. San Francisco Ball Club, 222
P.2d 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); Ratcliff v. San Diego Baseball Club, 81 P.2d 625 (Cal. Ct. App.
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demolition derby, 2 dog racing,"3 football,8 golf,8 5 horse racing,s6
ice hockey, 7 jai alai,88 tennis,8 polo, 0 rodeo riding,91 snowmobil-
ing,92 soap box derby,93 and wrestling. 4 Defendants in these cases
include the sponsors of the events, proprietors, players, and even a
team. 5 Theories of liability include premises liability, design de-
fect, negligent maintenance, and tortious breach of duty to provide
1938); Coronel v. Chicago White Sox, Ltd., 595 N.E.2d 45 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 602
N.E.2d 449 (Ill. 1992); Yates v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, 595 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992); Hudson v. Kansas City Baseball Club, 164 S.W.2d 318 (Mo. 1942); Olds v. St.
Louis Nat'l Baseball Club, 119 S.W.2d 1000 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Clapman v. City of New
York, 468 N.E.2d 697 (N.Y. 1984); Akins v. Glen Falls Sch. Dist., 424 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y.
1981); Starke v. Town of Smithtown, 547 N.Y.S.2d 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Uzdavines v.
Metro. Baseball Club, 454 N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982); Dent v. Texas Rangers, Ltd.,
764 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Friedman v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 731 S.W.2d 572
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (error refused n.r.e.); McNiel v. Fort Worth Baseball Club, 268 S.W.2d
244 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954); Leek v. Tacoma Baseball Club, 229 P.2d 329 (1951).
80. See, e.g., Borushek v. Kincaid, 397 N.E.2d 172 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); McFatridge v.
Harlem Globe Trotters, 365 P.2d 918 (N.M. 1961).
81. See, e.g., Altorfish v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 705 (La. Ct.
App. 1965).
82. See, e.g., JEFFREY K. RIFFER, SPORTS AND RECREATIONAL INJURIES 439-40 (1985).
83. Id. at 440.
84. See, e.g., Cimimo v. Yale University, 638 F. Supp. 952 (D. Conn. 1986); Cadieux v.
Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist., 566 N.Y.S.2d 895 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); Johnson v. Wood-
land Hills Sch. Dist., 582 A.2d 395 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990); Perry v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 405
P.2d 589 (Wash. 1965).
85. See, e.g., Richardson v. Muscato, 576 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. App. Div 1991); Thomas
C. Logan, Fore! Liability To Spectators at Golf Tournaments, 13 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 1207
(1990). Compare McDonald v. Huntington Crescent Club, Inc., 543 N.Y.S.2d 155 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989) (golf caddy struck by golfball); Taylor v. Churchill Valley Country Club, 228 A.2d
768 (Pa. 1967) (same).
86. See, e.g., Richoux v. Hebert, 449 So.2d 491 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
87. See, e.g., Uline Ice, Inc. v. Sullivan, 187 F.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Riley v. Chicago
Cougars Hockey Club, Inc., 427 N.E.2d 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Rosa v. County of Nassau,
544 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Gilchrist v. City of Troy, 494 N.E.2d 1383 (N.Y.
1986); Pestalozzi v. Philadelphia Flyers Ltd., 576 A.2d 72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Kennedy v.
Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329 (R.I. 1977).
88. See, e.g., Fazio v. Alai Palace, Inc., 473 So.2d 1345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); West
Flager Assocs. v. Jackson, 457 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
89. See, e.g., Chareas v. Township of High Sch. Dist., 553 N.E.2d 23 (1990); Thomas
A. Scutti, Note, Tort Law: McEnroe Tries A Different Court: No Injury From A Big Mac
Attack, 7 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 465 (1987).
90. See, e.g., Douglas v. Converse, 93 A. 955 (1915); Cases of Interest-Liability of
Polo Player to Spectator Injured While Watching Game, 19 LAW NOTES 73 (1915).
91. See, e.g., Creel v. Washington Parish Fair Assoc., 597 So.2d 487 (La. Ct. App.
1992).
92. See RIFER, supra note 82, at 441-42.
93. Id. at 442.
94. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mid-South Sports, Inc., 806 P.2d 1107 (Okla. 1991); Frick v.
Ensor, 557 So.2d 1022 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Silvia v. Woodhouse, 248 N.E.2d 260 (Mass.
1969).
95. See also WEISTART, supra note 19, § 8.03.
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reasonable care.
A fact scenario might arise such that a spectator could assert
and maintain a lawsuit based upon a sports official's failure to
properly control the participants or even the spectators. To
illustrate:
A frequent and aggravating problem in baseball, due to the open
air arrangement of most fields, is the encroachment of spectators
into live ball areas. This is something that always has been and
always will be a source of difficulty. You [as sports official] must
emphasize to coaches (and athletic directors, if available), that it
is incumbent upon them to make arrangements to supervise the
spectators in such a way that they will not be standing or seated
or walking bicycles in an area where the baseball, if it goes
there, is still in play. If you don't, once again an injured party
may well try to send the bill to you [as sports official] in the
form of a lawsuit.96
Furthermore, injured spectators, caught in suddenly-frantic
crowds, may then look to the sports official for recovery. Finally,
a spectator assaulted by an official may bring suit."8
The legal rules for spectator suits against officials, as in a
premises liability suit or failure to control claim, remain untested.
Some states' statutory provisions give sports officials immunity
from claims of ordinary negligence.99 Despite the immunity, sports
officials still face the possibility of lawsuits coming from all angles.
An overzealous and uncontrolled fan who, absent control or re-
straint, could cause injuries either to him or herself or others, still
presents quite a problem for the sports official.100
96. GOLDBERGER, supra note 10, at 46. Cf. Mel Narol, Fan vs. Ump: Potential Liabil-
ity for Fan Injury, 10 REFEREE 59, 59 (Dec. 1985) (describing California case where specta-
tor recovered damages against baseball umpire after spectator had been struck by foul ball).
97. As one commentator has noted:
[A]nother aspect of possible litigation that seems to have implications for offi-
cials: the rowdy and uncontrolled crowd behavior at some athletic contests. Sev-
eral officials with whom I have talked have stated emphatically that if the organ-
ization responsible for control of the fans and the well-being of the officials did
not take- the necessary action to ensure their safety, they would definitely take
legal action. The uncontrolled, boisterous conduct of more and more spectators
at games is one of the major concerns of officials.
SPoRTs AND LAW, supra note 10, at 14.
98. One Canadian Court has encountered this exact situation. See Foy v. Lourenco, 3
A.C.W.S.3d 211 (Ont. Dist. Ct. 1987) (suit by spectator for assault by referee with court
reducing referee's liability by forty percent based on finding of extreme provocation by
spectator).
99. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
100. This Author recently witnessed the following scenario: Two rival boys ice hockey
teams were in the midst of an emotional and close game when one team developed a "two
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D. The Sports Official As Plaintiff
Sports officials, more and more, are bringing lawsuits to re-
cover for their injuries. For example, officials have brought suit for
injuries sustained from tortious battery, 101 defamation, 02 as-
sault,103 defective products,104 tortious interference with economic
relations,105 as well as other tort claims.106
on one" breakout heading into the other team's defensive zone. Despite efforts by one of the
defending team's players to prevent the attacking player from getting a shot on goal, one of
the attacking players was successful in getting off a shot which the goalie stopped. However,
the goalie was unable to control the rebound and by pure accident one of the defensive
players shot the puck into his own goal. Visibly upset with his mistake, this player skated to
a corner of the rink where he suddenly and violently swung his stick at the plexiglass panels
surrounding the rink. Two spectators were standing directly in front of the panels and for-
tunately neither of the panels shattered. By this time, the two officials on the ice took notice
of the player's extreme disposition and began to skate towards him. However, before the
officials met up with the player, he had swung his stick in a rotary fashion and then released
it into the crowd. Fortunately, the player's stick missed a spectator (but just barely). Had
the stick struck a spectator there was a good chance that a serious injury would have been
incurred. Had a spectator been hit by this stick could the spectator have maintained an
action against the officials for failing to control the players?
101. See, e.g., Baugh v. Redmond, 565 So.2d 953 (La. Ct. App. 1990).
102. See Parks v. Steinbrenner, 520 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). When con-
sidering a cause of action for defamation on behalf of a sports official, one commentator,
Mel Narol, an expert in the area of sports law involving sports officials, advocates resolution
of the following issues: (1) what was said about the official; (2) whether the declarant may
take advantage of any defenses including "fair comment;" (3) whether the sports official is a
"public figure;" and (4) whether the statement was defamatory per se. See Narol, Defama-
tion, supra note 9, at 43. Of these factors, Narol considers the "public figure" one to be
most critical in light of the attendant proof problems applying to such figures. Id. See JOHN
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1037-038 (4th ed. 1991) (stating
requirement for successful defamation action where person defamed was a "public official"
is showing that such statement was made with actual malice). According to Narol, profes-
sional sports officials would probably qualify as "public figures;" however, "sports officials at
lower competition levels" may not. Narol, Defamation, supra note 9, at 44 (footnote omit-
ted). The factors which may help determine whether the non-professional sports official is a
"public figure" include "1) [the] level of competition being officiated; 2) [the] number of
years the sports official has been officiating; 3) whether the athletic contest was broadcast on
radio or television; and 4) the sports official's notoriety in the particular sports community."
Id.
103. See Toone v. Adams, 137 S.E.2d 132 (N.C. 1964). See also SPORTS AND LAW,
supra note 10, at 191-92; BALEY, supra note 10, at 6 (stating referee has cause of action for
defamation where a "publication exposes an official to destruct, hatred, contempt, ridicule,
or shame or when the comments tend to be injurious to the person's office, occupation,
business or employment, as seen in the minds of a substantial segment of the community").
104. See Rostad v. On-Deck, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1006
(1985) (umpire brought suit against batting weight manufacturer after being struck by the
weight during a softball game).
105. See Beck v. Croft, 700 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App.), review denied, 299 Or. 583, 704
P.2d 513 (Or. 1985).
106. See, e.g., Hickey v. Nat'l League of Professional Baseball, 565 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66
(N.Y. App. Div. 1991), where a fiancee brought an action for negligent and intentional inflic-
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With regard to officials' non-intentional injuries sustained
during the course of the game, some courts have denied an official's
recovery because he or she had been guilty of contributory negli-
gence,0 7 or had assumed the risk of injury. 08 This proposition has
been expressed as follows:
Players, coaches, managers, referees and others who, in one way
or another, voluntarily participate must accept the risks to
which their roles expose them. Of course, this is not to say that
actionable negligence can never be committed on a playing field.
Considering the skill of the players, the rules and nature of the
particular game, and risks which normally attend it, a partici-
pant's conduct may amount to such careless disregard for the
safety of others as to create risks not fairly assumed. But it is
nevertheless true that what the scorekeeper may record as an
"error" is not the equivalent, in law, of negligence."0 9
tion of emotional distress on behalf of a deceased baseball umpire on the theory that the
league subjected the umpire to a "grueling" schedule.
107. See, e.g., Hanna v. State, 258 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y. Cl. Ct. 1965). In Hanna, the
plaintiff, a participant who had volunteered to be an umpire for a game of baseball, stood
behind the catcher and also behind a backstop which was in place to prevent balls which
had either been foul tipped or missed by the catcher. The plaintiff, while standing within
the netted backstop, was subsequently struck by a foul tip which he claimed came through
the backstop's netting. He then sued the college where the game had been played (and who
also was the owner of the backstop) for negligence. In holding for the college, the trial court
found that the plaintiff was barred from recovering because he was "aware that there pur-
posely was slack in the netting of the backstop and was chargeable with knowledge that to
stand with his face too close to the net would be dangerous, and that his act in doing so
constituted contributory negligence .... " Id. at 698.
108. See, e.g., Dillard v. Little League Baseball Inc., 390 N.Y.S.2d 735 (N.Y. App.
Div.), appeal denied, 364 N.E.2d 1345, (N.Y. 1977). Cf. Davis v. Jones, 112 S.E.2d 3, 6 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1959) (holding wrestling timekeeper who was injured when wrestler fell upon him
was "charged with knowledge that danger or harm might result to one sitting within three
feet of the ring"). In Davis, the timekeeper had sought to hold the event's promoters liable
for their failure to warn of the danger complained of. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged
other negligent acts on the part of the promoters. In respect to the timekeeper's claim that
the promoters had breached their duty to warn, the court noted:
The only duty we can think of which was owed by the defendants to the plain-
tiff, . . . was the duty to warn of any unusual dangers which the defendant[s]
had reason to anticipate. The contention of the plaintiff that the defendants
should have anticipated the behavior attributed to the defendant Dizzy Davis
[the wrestler who fell on the timekeeper] and should have warned the plaintiff
thereof is wholly without merit because to our minds the defendants, in order to
have anticipated such behavior, would not only have had to be clairvoyant but
would have had to be equipped with supernatural powers beyond the capacity of
common man. The defendants owed the plaintiff only a limited duty, and like
the duties of ordinary care, it encompassed only the probable, not the possible,
unexpected or unascertainable.
Id.
109. McGee v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York, 226 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331-32 (N.Y.
App. Div.) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 190 N.E.2d 537, (N.Y.), appeal denied, 240
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In such cases, the courts have also applied the familiar "reck-
lessness" standard to bar a sport official's recovery where the
tortfeasor's conduct rose only to the level of ordinary negligence.
For example, one New York court recently stated:
We hold that the decedent's [a tennis umpire] injuries and sub-
sequent death [from being struck by a tennis ball] were not the
proximate result of a breach of duty owed by defendant to the
decedent. As a matter of law, a participant in a sporting event
assumes the risk of injuries normally associated with the sport.
Being hit by a tennis ball is surely a risk normally associated
with the sport as far as umpires are concerned. In our view, this
case is controlled by the rule .. . that by participating in a
sporting event, the plaintiff had consented that the extent of the
duty owed to him by the defendant-appellant was no greater
than merely to avoid reckless or intentionally harmful conduct.
Here, the decedent was fully aware of the risk of being hit by a
ball traveling at a rate of speed in excess of one hundred and
twenty miles per hour.110
In the case of a sports official suing for intentional torts in-
curred during a sporting event, the key inquiry is whether in fact
the sports official consented to the alleged tortious conduct. Addi-
tionally, a court must ask whether the conduct in question oc-
curred in the normal course of the game."1
N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. App. Div.), appeal denied, 193 N.E.2d 644 (N.Y. 1963). In McGee, a
high school teacher, "assigned by the school principal" to assist the coach during the prac-
tice, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 330, sustained injuries from being struck by a baseball thrown while
the teacher was standing behind the pitcher's mound. The teacher sued, arguing that the
coach had wrongfully directed practice on a "diamond of nonregulation size," and that the
coach had negligently departed from the routine practice procedure. Id. at 331. Although
the teacher obtained a favorable verdict at trial, the appellate court reversed the judgment
and dismissed the teacher's complaint. Interestingly, the court rejected the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the "nonregulation size" had "materially increased the hazards to which the
plaintiff was exposed." Id. at 332. The court stated that the teacher, as "participant," as-
sumed the risk of playing field "even though it does not meet 'official' or 'regulation' stan-
dards." Id. (citations omitted). Whether this same finding would be sustained in the case of
a sports official allowing a game or sports event to take place on a "nonregulation" field
remains to be seen.
110. Wertheim v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 443, 444 (N.Y. App. Div.),
appeal denied, 547 N.E.2d 101, (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted, emphasis added). The New
York "rule" the court was referring to was the court's holding in Turcotte v. Fell, 502
N.E.2d 964 (N.Y. 1986).
111. This standard is explained as follows:
A sports official may bring suit seeking damages for an injury intentionally
inflicted while officiating. In these assault and battery cases, the major questions
are whether or not the official has consented to the physical contact inherent in
the sport and whether or not it occurred as "part of the game."...
Like a player, a sports official consents by implication only to those inten-
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Whatever the officials' theory of liability, the official can only
be thought to have assumed the risk, or consented to those acts,
which are a "part of the game." '112 As such, a sports official does
well to show that the tortfeasor acted beyond the scope of the ath-
letic event; this counters the tort defendant's assumption-of-the-
risk (or consent) argument."'
PART II: CRITIQUE OF THE STATE OF THE LAW AND A SUGGESTED
APPROACH
A. The Need For A Proper Standard
It becomes necessary to reiterate the importance of defining
the proper legal standard governing sports officials. Sports law
tests an increasingly varied group of claims (which are brought
against coaches, schools, governmental entities, and teams). Inevi-
tably, sports officials will get sued with greater frequency. As is the
case with the other types of defendants, the difference in the stan-
dard of liability will usually determine the outcome of the suit.
Courts must uniformly apply a gross negligence or recklessness
standard, and refrain from imposing liability based on ordinary
negligence.
Recent cases affecting coaches and athletic supervisors illus-
trate the danger in allowing the threshold for the sports official's
liability to fall below the level of gross negligence or recklessness.
For example, in Parisi v. Harpursville Cent. Sch. Dist.,"4 a plain-
tiff survived a motion for summary judgment in a negligence claim
which alleged a coach's failure to provide protective equipment. A
school's softball player (the catcher) sued her school district, the
coach and her assistant, for serious injuries sustained when she was
struck by a pitch. The girl was hit during a practice pitching ses-
sion, when she momentarily looked away towards the scoreboard
(as she customarily did). Plaintiff's theory was that neither the
tional acts that are "part of the game." A football official understands that he
might be in the path of a player who may run into and injure him during the
course of a play. When a player or coach becomes upset and shoves or strikes an
official, clearly that behavior is not "part of the game;" in this case recovery is
possible.
SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10, at 189.
112. See Narol, Kill the Umpire, supra note 10, at 33.
113. Id. at 34 ("The defense of assumption of the risk can be overcome in an appropri-
ate case through close analysis of the facts and the sport to determine what actually consti-
tutes [a] 'part of the game.' ").
114. 553 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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coach nor her assistant instructed her to wear a mask while catch-
ing on this day, and that this failure to instruct constituted a
breach of duty.
In sustaining the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, a New York appellate court held that a
jury question existed as to "whether the failure to supply a face
mask for plaintiff's use or to instruct or require her to use a face
mask was a breach of sound coaching practice."115
The court's interpretation of a state high school athletic asso-
ciation rule, which required catchers in that particular league to
wear a "helmet and mask" as well as protective equipment, makes
Parisi potentially applicable (and of concern) to sports officials.116
Conceivably, Parisi can form the basis for a negligence claim
against a sports official based on the official's failure to ensure that
a participant is wearing the proper protective equipment. However,
to the extent that in Parisi the coach's failure to tell her catcher to
wear a mask may be an instance of gross negligence, the case is not
tremendously troubling for sports officials.11 7
Parisi stands as a troublesome decision, however, in the in-
stance where a particular league or sport makes the protective
equipment (or a portion thereof), which some may deem "essen-
tial," optional. The rule in such cases should be that a sports offi-
cial will not be liable for failing to require any player to wear more
equipment than is required under the rules. The reasoning behind
this conclusion is that it would be unfair to impose liability upon
an official who has no power to require a player to wear the equip-
ment in the first place.
Current sports law tests other types of negligence claims, such
as player mismatching. Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ.115
illustrates this negligence theory. In Benitez, a high school football
player sued the New York City Board of Education and the Public
Schools Athletic League after sustaining a broken neck during a
football game. Prior to the game in question, school officials ele-
vated plaintiff's team to a more competitive league over the team's
objection. The team opposed the move because of the greater risk
of injury accompanying the increased competition level.11 9 The
115. Id. at 567 (citation omitted).
116. Id.
117. The court's conclusion would not be reached in all sports. For example, in some
sports, such as womens' lacrosse, helmets are, actually forbidden. Beth Krodel, Women's
Game Tries to Head Off Helmet Flap, USA TODAY, June 13, 1991, at 9C.
118. 541 N.E.2d 29 (N.Y. 1989).
119. Specifically, the plaintiff's team objected to its elevation as follows:
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school principal also rejected the coach's request for reconsidera-
tion, which came just prior to this game.
12 0
Plaintiff argued that the defendants acted negligently in plac-
ing his team in the more competitive division, and allowing them
to play the game "in the face of an obvious mismatch . "12... "I
Additionally, the plaintiff claimed exposure to harm as a result of
being allowed to play "virtually the entire first half of the game
without adequate rest.'
2 2
A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, finding the defend-
ants negligent in allowing (a) such an obvious mismatch, and (b)
plaintiff's continued participation given his fatigued state. 23 The
intermediate appellate court affirmed the decision.
However, New York's Court of Appeals found that the trial
court instructed the jury to apply an incorrect standard of care,
and reversed. '2  According to the Benitez court, the trial judge
GW [plaintiff's team] had been placed in Division A prior to the 1982 season
[the plaintiff sustained his injury in the 1983 season] by the Football Committee
of the PSAL [i.e., defendant Public Schools Athletic League]. The PSAL deter-
mined, pursuant to established guidelines, that GW was better suited for Divi-
sion A competition than the less competitive Division B league where GW had
been dominant the three previous seasons. GW exhausted its administrative ap-
peals, arguing throughout that Division A competition was "potentially danger-
ous to the safety and welfare of the team" and that the players might "suffer
serious injuries." Before the start of the 1983 season, GW again sought to be
assigned to Division B, citing among its grounds safety concerns and the injury
toll suffered by the team during the 1982 season. Under PSAL administrative
guidelines and because the injuries suffered by GW players were akin in number
and degree with those of other Division A teams, this request for reassignment
was also denied.
Id. at 31.
120. Specifically, the coach warned that the playing of the game "was a mismatch and
should not be played because of the high risk of injury." Id. At trial, the coach testified that
despite the principal's rejection of the coach's plea and the coach's self-viewed "responsibil-
ity to pull a team off the field in the face of unsafe competition," the coach did not "unilat-




124. Id. At the trial level, the court instructed the jury "that a school owes a student
voluntarily competing in an interscholastic high school football game the more protective
duty and standard of care of a prudent parent." Id. at 32 (citations omitted). Later New
York cases have described the "prudent parent" standard. In Shante D. by Ada D. v. City of
New York, Bd. of Educ. Local Sch. No. 5, 598 N.Y.S.2d 475, 478 (N.Y. App. Div.), leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeals, 603 N.Y.S.2d 722 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (citation omitted),
the court stated "[sichool boards generally have a duty to supervise their students with the
same degree of care as a parent would exercise in the same circumstances." Thus, the test is
whether the person or entity "exercised the same degree of care in supervising [someone]
• . . as would a reasonably prudent parent." Id. See also Homer v. Bd. of Educ. of LaFay-
ette, LaFayette Cent. Schs., 577 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1010 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (same); Snyder
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should have instructed the jury to apply a duty of "ordinary rea-
sonable care. 12' 5 The court further found that the plaintiff as-
sumed the risk of injury,"'6 thereby precluding the defendants'
breach of a duty to guard the plaintiff from any "unassumed, con-
cealed or unreasonably increased risks.11 7 Contrary to plaintiff's
assertion, his assumption of the risk was not negated by any "in-
herent compulsion.
'12 8
Although the Benitez court found no liability on the part of
the defendants, different facts might yield a different result.12'
v. Morristown Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 563 N.Y.S.2d 258, 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (same).
125. 541 N.E.2d at 32 (citations omitted).
126. The court held:
Fatigue and, unfortunately, injury are inherent in team competitive sports, espe-
cially football. Benitez was concededly an excellent athlete, properly equipped
and well-trained. He was playing voluntarily in the same manner as he had for
the previous year and one half against Division A competition and had not re-
quested rest or complained. Within the breadth and scope of his consent and
participation, plaintiff put himself at risk in the circumstances of this case for
the injuries he ultimately suffered. On his own proof, he thus failed to meet the
burden of showing some negligent act or inaction, referenced to the applicable
duty of care owed by him by these defendants, which may be said to constitute
"a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury." The injury in this
case, in sum, was a luckless accident arising from the vigorous voluntary partici-
pation in competitive interscholastic athletics.
Id. at 34 (citations and quotation omitted).
127. Id. at 33 (emphasis added).
128. Id. According to New York law, there is an important "legal distinction[] . . . [to
be] drawn between compulsory physical education courses and voluntary participation in
interscholastic athletic activity, as well as between professional and amateur status," the
important distinction being that the former conduct can be referred to as an "inherent com-
pulsion" that effectively negates, in whole or part, the assumption of risk defense. Id. at 32
(citations omitted). The Benitez court further explained the doctrine as follows.
The theory of inherent compulsion provides that the defense of assumption of
the risk is not a shield from liability, even where the injured party acted despite
obvious and evident risks, when the element of voluntariness is overcome by the
compulsion of a superior. Two factors are generally present to sustain a finding
of liability on an inherent compulsion theory despite the injured party's knowl-
edge of the risk, "a direction by a superior to do the act" and "an economic
compulsion or other circumstance which equally impels" compliance with the
direction. Though the risk is foreseen, an assurance of safety generally implicit
in the supervisor's direction supplants the plaintiff's assumption of the risk by
requiring action despite prudent cautionary concerns.
Id. at 33 (citations and quotations omitted).
Based on this test, the court found that the plaintiff failed to present evidence which
showed that he "had no choice but to follow the coach's direction to play despite his con-
cern over enhanced risk factors known by or communicated to the coach." Id. at 34 (citation
omitted).
129. In fact, a recent New Jersey case demonstrates that negligent mismatching can
lie as a viable claim. See Zipper v. Ocean Ice Palace, No. 4200-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.,
Dec. 6, 1993). In Zipper, the 13-year-old plaintiff sued the hockey arena where he had sus-
tained injury from a 19-year-old's slap shot. Plaintiff asserted a negligent mismatch theory,
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Such a result would certainly have a negative implication for
sports officials. In fact, the court's phrasing of the standard of care,
whereby the defendants owed athletes an ordinary reasonable
duty of care, remains troubling in itself. While the court found no
liability, the standard of care it applied, under a different set of
facts, offers sports officials too low a threshold of liability. To reit-
erate this Comment's position, no liability should attach unless the
plaintiff shows that the defendants (i.e., sports officials) acted
recklessly or in a grossly negligent manner.
B. Substantiating The Proper Standard
Several legal justifications support the imposition of civil lia-
bility on an official only where his or her action (or inaction) con-
stitutes either reckless or grossly negligent conduct. These argu-
ments are addressed below.
Some courts and commentators note that "the duty of care
owed by a player to an umpire during the course of a game is the
same as that owed to another player;"'- 0 it makes logical and equi-
table sense to apply this rule in the converse situation (referring to
the official's duty to a player). 13 Since participants owe fellow
players a duty to not act recklessly,3 2 recklessness and not ordi-
noting first that he was paired with other players 16 and 18 years old, and secondly that in
the "all star" game where he was injured, his team played a group of counselors and instruc-
tors. At trial, the plaintiff presented expert testimony to the effect that his shin pads could
not have contained more padding to prevent the injury. Plaintiff's experts also testified to
the hazards created by such a mismatch in age and skill level. The jury returned a plaintiff's
verdict in the amount of $500,000. 14 N.J. VERDICT REV. 3, 4 (Dec. 1993). Subsequently,
however, following a motion for a new trial, the case was reversed as to damages. Telephone
Interview with Bruce H. Stern, Esq., Plaintiff's Counsel (Mar. 10, 1994).
130. See, e.g., Stewart v. D & R Welding Supply Co., 366 N.E.2d 1107, 1108 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1977) (citations omitted); CHAMPION, supra note 9, § 4:1, at 78 (declaring "the duty of
care owed by a participant to an official during the course of the game is the same as that
owed to another player." (footnote omitted)).
131. At least one commentator argues that such a rationale is flawed:
Legal commentators have suggested that the duty owed by a referee to an ath-
lete can be found by examining the duty owed by one sports participant to an-
other. The duty owed by a referee, then, would be to refrain from affirmative
misconduct. The problem with such a view, however, is that it fails to recognize
that a significant difference exists between the conduct of the referee-defendant
and that of the participant-defendant. In the participant liability cases the de-
fendant's affirmative misconduct results in the injury of a fellow participant.
Whether a referee's negligence can be defined as affirmative misconduct is an
open question. Arguably, the negligent referee is culpable not because of a fail-
ure to act in a proper manner, but rather because of a failure to act at all.
Davis, supra note 2, at 943 (footnote omitted).
132. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979); Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989); Turcotte v. Fell, 502
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nary negligence should define the sports official's duty.
In applying this standard to sports officials, at least when they
are sued by sports participants (i.e., players), one commentator
suggests the following formulation:
N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 672 P.2d 290 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983);
Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). See also LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND
AMATEUR SPORTS § 14.01[4], at 14-6 (Gary A. Uberstine ed., 1990); 2 STUART M. SPEISER et.
al., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:43, at 1328-29 (1985); Mel Narol, Sports Participant
with Limited Litigation: The Emerging Reckless Disregard Standard, 1 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 29, 30 (1991) [hereinafter Narol, Emerging Standard]; Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts &
Sports: Participant Liability to Co-Participants for Injuries Sustained During Competi-
tion, 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 191, 195, 198 (1990); Lawrence P. Rochefort, A
Course of Action for Florida Courts to Follow When Injured Sports Participants Assert
Causes of Action, 4 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 257, 262 (1987); Mel Narol, Sports
Torts: A Standard of Care Issue, 134 N.J. LAW. 41 (May/June 1990). But see Lazaroff,
supra, at 213-14 (questioning propriety of recklessness standard for contact sports such as
boxing, football, and ice hockey).
For a short period of time, it appeared that New Jersey had abandoned the majority
rule in favor of an ordinary negligence standard. See, e.g., Crawn v. Campo, 630 A.2d 368
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), aff'd as modified, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 1994). In Crawn, a
New Jersey appellate court surveyed other case law from a majority of states that applied
the reckless standard to suits between participants, and rejected this standard. Specifically,
the court held that "negligent conduct" was sufficient to establish liability as between par-
ticipants. 630 A.2d at 375 (footnote omitted). The court also stated:
[almong the factors that might bear on the issue of reasonable care in a sports
event are: what sport was involved; whether it was a professional game or an
amateur contest; what equipment was involved in the sport, and what was its
purpose; whether the sport was conducted pursuant to a recognized set of rules,
an informal set of rules, or no rules at all; whether the injurious conduct violated
a rule of the contest and, if so, whether the rules was designed for the partici-
pants' safety; what was the ultimate purpose of the game and what were the
customary methods of winning it; what the ages, physical characteristics and
skills of the participants; what knowledge of the rules and customs of the game
the participant possessed; what degree of competitiveness the activity involved;
and what relationship the participants' conduct bore to the ultimate purpose of
the contest.
Id. at 376 (citations omitted).
However, the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed. The court cited various policy con-
siderations and legal practicalities, arriving at the conclusion that a "heightened standard"
should apply:
[W]e hold that the duty of care in establishing liability arising from informal
sports activity should be based on a standard that requires, under the circum-
stances, conduct that is reckless or intentional. Our conclusion that a reckless-
ness standard is the appropriate one to apply in the sports context is founded on
more than a concern for a court's ability to discern adequately what constitutes
reasonable conduct under the highly varied circumstances of informal sports ac-
tivity. The heightened standard will more likely result in affixing liability for
conduct that is clearly unreasonable and unacceptable from the perspective of
those engaged in the sport yet leaving free from the supervision of the law the
risk-laden conduct that is inherent in sports and more often than not assumed
to be "part of the game."
643 A.2d at 607.
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[A] player claimed to have been injured by a[] . . . sports offi-
cial . . . during the course of a game may recover only if the
player can show that the defendant acted in reckless disregard
for his safety. Once this standard is adopted, then the inquiry
must focus upon whether the defendant participant's conduct
was "part of the game." If it was, then the defendant not having
acted with reckless disregard will win, if it is not, then the plain-
tiff will win. Analysis of whether the act was "part of the game"
must deal with such factors as competition level, skill level,
sport involved, when during the game the incident occurred, the
type of play involved, manner in which the play evolved, rules of
the sport and interpretations of the rules of the sport. 8
Nevertheless, imposing a recklessness/gross negligence stan-
dard for sports officials may cause confusion in those states that
have adopted comparative negligence.134 Where it has occurred (in
133. See Narol, Emerging Standard, supra note 132, at 39-40. Other commentators
also indicate support for a recklessness standard which affords consideration to the rules of
the sport. One author, referring to player versus player lawsuits decided under a reckless-
ness standard, phrased the proper test in a similar fashion, incorporating tortious reckless-
ness and rule violations:
An alternative approach to an objective standard based exclusively on a rule
violation is the adoption of a tort standard that combines the traditional reck-
lessness test with a rules and customs violation approach. A sports participant
would be liable in tort to another participant if (1) the conduct causing personal
injury constituted a violation of the safety rules and "common law" customs of
the sport (an objective standard), and (2) such injurious conduct constituted a
reckless act (a more subjective standard).
The main benefit of this approach is that sports participants receive some
legal protection for injuries resulting from rules and customs violations. To be
actionable, however, these violations must occur with the defendant's knowledge
that the conduct either was "illegal" or would result in a strong possibility of
injury to the plaintiff. Defendants would not be protected by ignorance of spe-
cific rules so long as the challenged conduct could be deemed reckless.
Lazaroff, supra note 132, at 223.
134. As one commentator has noted:
Most courts considered gross negligence different from ordinary negligence in
degree only, and not in kind. Nevertheless, in order to avoid the "all or nothing"
effect of the doctrine of contributory negligence, some courts declined to bar a
contributorily negligent plaintiff's recovery when the defendant was grossly neg-
ligent. There remains some question as to the status of the "gross negligence"
distinction in comparative negligence jurisdictions which formerly recognized it
as a valid limitation on the defense of contributory negligence. Most of the cases
which have considered the issue have held that the adoption of comparative neg-
ligence has, at least by implication, abolished the common-law concept of "gross
negligence." The courts have reasoned that since gross negligence is but one of
many different degrees of negligence, comparative negligence should be applica-
ble in apportioning damages no matter how great the differences. Also, jurisdic-
tions which have chosen to compare fault when the defendant's conduct can be
characterized as "willful, wanton, or reckless," usually apportion damages in
cases of gross negligence.
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the context of general tort principles), the results vary. In Pennsyl-
vania, the courts do not treat wilful and wanton misconduct (ar-
guably differing in degree, but not in kind, from gross negligence)
"as a form of negligence, and thus will not apply comparative neg-
ligence principles where such conduct is found." 18 In other states
such as New Jersey, "if both parties were engaged in wilful and
wanton conduct, the plaintiff will be precluded from recovering
damages, despite the comparative negligence statute."13 6 Despite
the potential confusion caused by application of a recklessness
standard in some states, this perhaps remains the standard's only
drawback.
Adversarial fairness demands consideration of the assumption-
of-risk defense, a concept intimately related to the contributory/
comparative negligence question. As illustrated,13 7 the assumption
of risk doctrine serves as a significant obstacle to a sports official's
cause of action."3 8 Lawsuits brought against sports officials merit
the same scrutiny. Assuming this were the case, the assumption of
risk defense would eliminate those suits where the danger was ei-
ther known or obvious to the injured participant(s). 189
Strong public policy concerns also militate against imposing
liability on the sports official for his or her (non-reckless) negligent
acts.
Few men and women would be willing to officiate athletic con-
tests if their mere negligence could result in incurring personal
liability for injuries sustained by players. Courts have endeav-
ored to avoid discouraging the free participation in sports. Simi-
larly, a balance should be drawn so that officials are held ac-
countable for reckless conduct while not discouraging their
participation. The duty required of an official to avoid such tor-
tious liability should be the diligent enforcement of all safety
rules. This does not mean that an official would incur liability if
1 ARTHuR BEST, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 4.30131, at 4-97 to 4-99 (1994 rev. perm. ed.)
(footnotes omitted).
135. JOHN JAMES PALMER AND STEPHEN M. FLANAGAN, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MAN-
uAL §1.240 (Supp. 1993) (footnote omitted).
136. Id. (footnote omitted).
137. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
138. "Sports officials have a difficult time recovering damages for injuries that are
judged to be the result of an inherent risk in an activity. The doctrine of assumption of risk
usually prevents the official from recovering damages, since the court assumes that the offi-
cial was aware of the risk and engaged in the activity with the knowledge that he could be
injured." SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10, at 190.
139. See, e.g., Russini v. Incorporated Village of Mineola, 584 N.Y.S.2d 622, 622 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992) (barring softball player's lawsuit against village where hole in which player
tripped and fell was not "concealed" therefore player assumed risk of injury).
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he fails to call every violation that occurs on the field. An official
would be held liable only when he acts in willful or reckless dis-
regard of his duty to enforce that safety rules [sic] of the partic-
ular game. 140
The practical effect of a low liability threshold for sports offi-
cials-endangered sports activities-underscores the need for a
more forgiving standard.
Because the willingness of volunteers to participate in organized
youth activities is clearly affected by the threat of liability, both
actual and perceived, one enormous cost of tort liability is to
place in jeopardy the legion of volunteers that run most organ-
ized youth activities. Moreover, the quality of the relationships
between the participants, their families, and the volunteers in
these activities is undermined by the threat of tort claims. For
volunteers, when the willingness to participate is so elastic, the
choice is not between careful and careless volunteers. It is be-
tween protected volunteers and no volunteers at all.
[T]he most obvious effect [of potential tort liability] has been to
discourage many volunteers from undertaking or continuing vol-
unteer services. A majority of 8,000 executives of volunteer as-
sociations surveyed recently indicated that fear of liability expo-
sure and of litigation in general is damaging their efforts at
volunteer recruitment. Although the number of lawsuits against
volunteers is difficult to quantify, the publicity of such cases has
nevertheless had a significant impact. To compound matters, the
cost of liability insurance for volunteers has been prohibitive,
and is often simply not obtainable.
1 4 1
Putting aside the argument for a recklessness/gross negligence
standard, non-legal solutions (to the problem of official's
threatened liability) demand consideration as well. For example,
leagues should tighten the playing rules of their particular sport to
give sports officials more control over the game.1 42 Indeed, officials
140. Rains, supra note 45, at 808 (footnote omitted).
141. Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activi-
ties-The Alternative to "Ner' Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 685, 689 (1992) (foot-
notes omitted).
142. Such action was recently taken by the national governing body of amateur ice
hockey, which implemented numerous changes to the "Abuse of Officials" rule. See USA
Hockey Rules, supra note 2, Rule 601. However, some commentators have posited that the
exact opposite occurs, i.e., that sports officials do not enforce safety or playing rules to con-
trol the game or, more importantly, the safety of the participants:
In an effort to curb violence once the players reach the field, game officials
should enforce the rules more strictly. Despite the need for having a "tight
game" called in the NFL [National Football League], the opposite has been the
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often use player-safety or equipment rules to prevent injury from
occurring."'
Case studies of certain player-safety rules, however, show that
sometimes such rules may be too difficult to apply."" On a more
fundamental level, certain sports themselves do not facilitate
player-safety rules."5 These practical realities tend to mitigate the
effect that non-legal solutions will have on the problem. Thus, it is
again suggested that the law uniformly adopt a recklessness/gross
negligence standard of sports officials' liability.
While a more stringent legal standard remains the best solu-
tion, the sports official can help his or her own cause and possibly
prevent liability by taking some obvious-yet easily over-
looked-steps. For example, he or she needs to ensure that the
playing field is in good condition. This would include both pre-
game and game-time inspections. 14  In the sport of baseball, the
case. According to one NFL coach, "As you progress up the ladder from high
school to pro, you see officials grow more liberal in their interpretation of the
rules, and that is a dangerous thing." Actually, because the potential for violence
seems to increase with the level of competition, common sense suggests that the
rules be enforced more stringently in professional sport than at lower levels.
Rains, supra note 45, at 811 (footnote omitted). See also JAMES A. BAILEY ET AL., LAW AND
LIABILITY IN ATHLETICS, PHYSICAL EDUCATION-AND RECEATION 140 (1988) (stating that "offi-
cials must crack down on the playing fields and floors by blowing their whistles and throw-
ing flags more often, giving bigger and more frequent penalties, and tightening up the game
from the point of view of enforcement of the rules, especially safety rules."). -
143. See, e.g., Vince Kowalick, Colonial Classic Notebook: Valley-Area Neihbors-
Stage Florida Showdown, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1988, at part 3, page 18, col. 4 (describing
baseball tournament event wherein umpires halted game because the players of one team
were wearing cleats made of illegal material).
144. See, e.g., Don Pierson, On Pro Football - Rule may be Dropped Because NFL
Refs Can't Seem to Grasp It, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 17, 1991, at 11 (describing NFL referees'
difficulties with implementing the "in the grasp" rule).
145. Ice hockey illustrates this fact. The sport's rules (amateur and/or professional
hockey, depending on the rule) provide for penalties for such things as elbowing, slashing
(striking another player with a stick), tripping, and "cross-checking" (checking a player with
both hands on the stick with the stick not touching the ice surface). By their very nature,
these rules are implemented after the infraction has occurred. There are no rules from
either amateur or professional hockey which permit a referee to penalize or discipline a
player before the injurious act occurs, much less prevent him or her from playing. Thus, it is
difficult to conceive how commentators can posit that sports officials should be liable for
permitting the tortious acts of others to occur. Simply put, in some sports the official may
have no authority to control or prohibit the tortious activity before it happens. Likewise, an
official's failure to assess a penalty against a player who commits a legally tortious act,
where the official had a reasonable belief that no penalty had been committed, should not
render the official liable because even if the official had made the call, the injury preceded
any official's acts and therefore, speaking in tort terminology, the official's acts were neither
the cause in fact nor the proximate cause of the player's injuries.
146. See SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10, at 198-202. But see Rooney v. Franklin Park
Park Dist., 628 N.E.2d 674 (IMI. App. Ct. 1993), appeal denied, 633 N.E.2d 14 (Ill. 1994). In
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umpire(s) need to make continuous, visible inspections of the field.
For basketball, "referees [should] make sure that there are no
loose balls around the gym on which a player might trip, that the
backboard has padding around it and that the court and surround-
ing area are clear for players. ' 14 7 Pre-game inspections, in particu-
lar, should take into account weather conditions.
4 8
Besides inspecting the playing field or surface, the sports offi-
cial should stay in "good shape." Safe competition demands a
healthy referee or umpire.
149
C. The Problem With Ordinary Negligence
Finally, any discussion of an appropriate standard of sports
officials' liability must point out the shortcomings of the perceived
prevailing standard, i.e., ordinary negligence. According to some
commentators, such a standard imposes liability on a sports official
Rooney, a player in a floor game (one played in gymnasiums-with plastic sticks and a plastic
puck) sued a local park district and two referees it employed after the player fell and in-
jured himself on floor mats that had been used to prevent pucks from going underneath
bleachers in the gymnasium where the game was played. Id. at 674-75. The court held that
under Illinois law, the referees could only be liable if it could be shown they had acted in a
willful and wanton manner. Id. at 675. The court, in applying this standard, held in favor of
the referees, findingthat "[a]t worst, defendants' conduct amounted to negligence." Id. at
676. Despite the finding of non-liability in Rooney, diligent and thorough pre- and post-
game inspections of the playing surface or field is strongly recommended. Admittedly, had
the court applied a different standard in Rooney, liability may have attached.
147. See SPORTS AND LAW, supra note 10, at 198.
148. Game-time weather conditions are a real issue. One author explains:
In deciding whether to begin play when the weather is bad the officials must first
inspect the condition of the playing surface. On one occasion in New Jersey, high
school football officials were sued for permitting a game to be played on a field
that was allegedly extremely muddy after a heavy rain and therefore unsafe. As
a player attempted to make a tackle, he fractured two vertebrae, resulting in
partial paralysis from the neck down. The player not only sued his coach and
school for failure to provide proper training and safe headgear, but also named
as defendants the game officials, alleging the condition of the field contributed to
his injury. The case was eventually dismissed against the officials, and a settle-
ment reached with the other defendants for approximately one million dollars.
Id. at 198.
149. See Rains, supra note 45, at 811-12, where the author argues that:
[tihe various leagues should impose more stringent age and physical condition
requirements on game officials. Effective supervision by referees must be a com-
ponent of any plan to combat sports violence. In setting forth referee "fitness"
requirements, cognizance must be taken of the player/official ratio and age and
physical ability disparities between player and officials. Referees are trying to
control contests in which the player to official ratio ranges from four to one in
football to six to one in hockey. Each of these players are in better physical
condition and possess athletic abilities which greatly exceed that of the official.
If the league, therefore, has any hope of controlling this fast-paced action and
the violence which it has bred, the officials must be in "top shape."
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in the following situation:
Since there is a duty to perform equivalent to acceptable norms,
if the [sports official's] error falls below that norm, then there
would be a breach of duty. If any of these types of mistakes are
made, and it is determined that there has been a breach of the
duty of care, an action in negligence may lie.
150
In these terms, commentators explaining the negligence stan-
dard define an "error" as an official's misidentifying facts. Such
errors may include an illegal catch ruled legal by mistake, misin-
terpreting rules, or misadministering penalties. 15 1 Under a negli-
gence standard, then, the law intends to hold sports officials liable
for their officiating errors.
This position is unsound for several reasons. First, it clashes
head-on with the established principle that courts will not inter-
fere with a sports official's officiating decision unless it is found to
have been based on corruption, bad faith, or fraud.152 Second, the
prevailing standard assumes that a causal connection exists be-
tween a player's physical injury and an official's misinterpretation
or misapplication of a rule.153
Any sports official wants to make the proper call and prevent
injury. However, the presence of an ordinary negligence standard
forces the official to "not only . . . perform his or her tasks in such
a manner so as to reduce the risks of physical injuries, but also to
reduce the risk of errors which may deprive a team of a victory or
monetary gain. "154 This focuses the official's attention on the
wrong thing-the ramifications of a call or ruling beyond the con-
fines of the playing field. In many instances, it is difficult enough
to focus on making the proper call as that call pertains to the
game, much less ponder the future legal effects of that call.
150. Lewis & Forbes, supra note 2, at 694 (footnotes omitted).
151. Id. at 694 n.119.
152. See supra note 19.
153. Previously, this Comment suggested that imposing liability on sports officials for
personal injuries sustained, after the misapplication or misinterpretation of a rule of the
game, would be improper in certain sports. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. In
fairness to the school of thought advocating the opposite position, it should be noted that
there are certain situations where the failure ofthe sports official to apply a rule would be
the cause (or contributing cause) of the player's injury:
For example, the rules of baseball require that a batter wear a helmet. Generally
speaking, it is safe to assume that if you permit a player to bat without a helmet
and he is struck in the head with a pitched ball, liability could attach to your
actions. Strong evidence of your liability could be found in the rule book.
GOLDBERGER, supra note 10, at 25.
154. See Lewis & Forbes, supra note 2, at 695.
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A negligence standard, in reality, pits the sports official
against another official: the prudent, reasonable official. Unfortu-
nately, this forces the typical official to become cautious in his calls
or non-calls when facing the threat of legal culpability for making
the wrong decision. This, in turn, negatively impacts the particular
game's dynamics.
Many jurisdictions follow a public policy not to emasculate the
sports official's ability, but to free it up so that competitive athlet-
ics prosper.15 To the extent that a negligence standard inhibits the
sports official, which in turn hampers competitive athletics, the
standard should be abandoned. Rather, the courts should only per-
mit recovery against a sports official who has acted recklessly or in
a grossly negligent manner.
CONCLUSION
Despite recent commentary to the effect that ordinary negli-
gence is the appropriate legal threshold for holding a sports official
liable, 5 ' negligence is the wrong standard. The school of thought
advocating this reasonableness standard displays incorrect pre-
sumptions and flawed reasoning.
Admittedly, the true "state" of sports official malpractice is
somewhat difficult to gauge, since the vast majority of cases settle
out of court.15 7 Nevertheless, the overwhelming weight of the au-
155. Many commentators agree with this position. See, e.g., Parvin, supra note 10, at
19.
156. See, e.g., RIFFPR, supra note 82, at 42 (Supp. 1993) (stating "commentators have
concluded that sports officials have a duty to use reasonable care .... " (citations omitted)).
157. One of the famous "unpublished" cases (by reason of settlement) that stood to be
a precedent-setting decision involved former Dallas Cowboy All-Pro Linebacker "Bubba"
Smith. The facts of the case were as follows:
On August 26, 1972, the Baltimore Colts and the Pittsburgh Steelers played a
preseason game in Tampa, Florida. The National Football League provided the
officiating crew for the game, but the people handling the down chain markers
were from the local area. Edward Marion was the head linesman that day and
Robert Lastra attended one of the down markers. Playing defensive end for the
Colts was Bubba Smith who, at 27 years of age, had just been named All-Pro
and NFL lineman of the year.
Late in the game, Smith's teammate, Rick Volk, intercepted a Terry Brad-
shaw pass and returned the ball upfiald. As Volk was running toward and along
the sideline where Marion and Lastra were positioned, Smith was running at full
speed trying to block for Volk. As the play reached the sideline, Smith claimed
he leaped over fallen players and struck the aluminum down marker, which he
claimed was still stuck in the ground. In his $2.5 million negligence lawsuit
against the National Football League, the Tampa Sports Authority, Edward
Marion, and Robert Lastra, Smith alleged that the collision with the marker
caused a serious knee injury that cut short his career.
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thority which has been written on the subject strongly suggests the
propriety of either a recklessness or gross negligence standard of
care. This Comment joins that position.
Perhaps the most logical and effective solution to implement-
ing the "gross negligence" approach would be for those states who
have not done so to adopt statutory provisions similar to those pre-
viously outlined. 158 Although this solution has been questioned, 15 9
it most effectively offers the sports official the necessary immu-
nity.1 60 Officials need qualified immunity to function effectively
(and possibly to participate at all) in their roles as guardians of
safe, competitive play. Without it, competitive athletics as an insti-
tution suffers.
For these reasons, the law must embrace a recklessness, rather
than negligence-based, liability standard. Under such a standard,
uniformly applied, a sports official's civil liability becomes the ex-
ception and not the rule. Enforcing that rule, i.e., qualified immu-
nity, constitutes a "good call."
Narol, Potential Liability, supra note 10, at 20. Although the case was tried twice, a jury
returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, however, as one commentator noted,
"[d]espite the verdict, this case is significant... because the judge allowed the case to go to
the jury, establishing for the first time that a sports official could possibly be found liable
for negligence during an athletic contest." Id. at 21.
158. See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
159. See King, supra note 141, at 709 (arguing for the use of exculpatory agreements
over statutory provisions because statutory provisions are ineffective because they do not
"directly inform participants of the limitations on liability until they are confronted with a
defense after litigation is commenced."). Exculpatory agreements, however, carry great ad-
ministrative burdens. Moreover, the possibility of unsuccessful second-level litigation (as to
the validity to such agreements) offers sports officials a strong disincentive. See SCHUBERT,
supra note 10, at 217 (stating "[e]xculpatory agreements are not favored by courts. If an
agreement is ambiguous or covers a definite time, place, or risk, it will not be interpreted to
absolve a tort-feasor of liability for harm caused at another time and place, or in a different
manner.").
Alternatively, one commentator suggests that a possible source of liability would be a
sports official's breach of an affirmative duty created by statute. See Davis, supra note 2, at
944-46 (describing boxing referee's liability under California statute requiring referee to stop
a fight when " 'a marked superiority'" is present or one boxer is "'apparently outclassed.'"
(citation omitted)). Unfortunately, this reasoning ignores the special relationship (in terms
of regulation) that states enjoy with the sport of boxing. See, e.g., Tilelli v. Christenberry,
120 N.Y.S.2d 697, 700 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953) (stating the "unsavory history of professional
boxing . . . reveals why boxing matches . . . are by legislative policy . . . made subject to
the most inexorable and meticulous regulation .... " (citation omitted)). It is inconceivable
that a state could (or would), for example, pass a similar statute requiring a hockey official,
for example, to suspend a player for fighting or injuring another player with his stick. Thus,
such a theory of liability appears limited to sports such as boxing and horse racing.
160. Furthermore, the legislature could tailor the rule of law to be applied to such
conduct, vis-a-vis comparative negligence, if that particular jurisdiction follows such a
scheme. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
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